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Abstract 
The dramatic increase in public law and human rights cases coming before the UK 
Supreme Court (and the Appellate Committee before it) means that the UK’s top court 
is more frequently determining essentially socio-political questions. In the light of this 
expanding judicial role, this thesis asks whether new mechanisms for increasing 
political accountability, such as a parliamentary confirmation procedure, are needed for 
appointment to the most senior judicial offices (including, but not limited to the UK 
Supreme Court). 
The research addresses the conceptual arguments for greater political accountability in 
the appointment process. It also considers the expanding ambit of judicial 
independence. Focusing on whether parliamentarians should have a role in the judicial 
appointments process; it asks what is meant by political accountability in the context of 
judicial appointments and considers what evidence there is that greater accountability is 
necessary. The research examines whether new methods of accountability could be 
introduced in the UK without impacting on judicial independence. It seeks to shed light 
on these questions by examining the recent move by the UK Parliament to introduce 
pre-appointment hearings for other senior posts and evaluates whether such processes 
are readily transferable and, if so, whether UK parliamentary committees are well 
placed to undertake this task. 
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 4 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
It is indisputable that the constitutional position of the judiciary has changed 
significantly in the past 40 years. Many of the changes reflect the new constitutional 
settlement and the transition in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Lord 
Phillips of Worth Matravers, the former President of the UK Supreme Court, has 
observed that: 
The citizen must be able to challenge the legitimacy of executive action before an 
independent judiciary. Because it is the executive that exercises the power of the 
State and because it is the executive, in one form or another, that is the most frequent 
litigator in the courts, it is from executive pressure or influence that judges require 
particularly to be protected.
1
 
This quotation is a useful scene-setter, since it reflects both a traditional view of judicial 
independence and the need for the judiciary to be protected against an overweening 
executive. In addition, it demonstrates some of the dangers facing the modern judiciary 
– in seeking to protect individuals from the increasing influence of the state, the 
judiciary finds itself inevitably drawn into the political arena. Moreover, it might also be 
argued that it illustrates how Parliament has been somewhat marginalised as 
commentators question its ability to hold the executive to account.
2
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis assesses the increasing tensions between the judiciary 
and other branches of Government; and it questions whether the current system might 
be improved by the introduction of some form of additional political accountability in 
the judicial appointments process. This research follows on from a paper produced by 
the author for the Study of Parliament Group (SPG) in 2010 entitled The Changing 
Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings?
3
 The SPG paper considered 
accusations that the UK judiciary had become more activist and increasingly inclined to 
                                                 
1
 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Judicial independence and accountability: a view from the 
Supreme Court, 8 February 2011, pp 6–7 
2
 This is not the place for a significant discussion on the merits and issues around legal and political 
constitutionalism. For that, see for example: Griffith, J.A.G The Political Constitution (1979) 42 
Modern Law Review 1, and The Common Law and the Political Constitution (2001) 117 Law 
Quarterly Review 42; Tomkins, A. Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005); 
Waldron, J. The Core of the case against judicial review (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346; Gee. 
G. and Webber, G.C.N. What is a Political Constitution? (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
273 and Horne, A. and Walker, C. Lessons Learned for Political Constitutionalism?: Comparing the 
enactment of Control Orders and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures by the UK 
Parliament, Public Law (forthcoming 2014) 
3
 Horne, A. The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings? (Study of 
Parliament Group, London, January 2010) 
 5 
thwart the will of the elected element. It concluded that this impression may be, in part, 
because judges are now frequently finding themselves adjudicating on issues that many 
would regard as being essentially ‘socio-political’ in context and also because the courts 
have expanded their remit, considering issues that historically would not have been 
considered justiciable. Scholars, such as Vernon Bogdanor and Conor Gearty, 
recognised the new tensions and cast around for potential solutions.
4
  
While it did not reach any settled view on the merits of the ‘activist’ argument, the SPG 
paper concluded that the perception of increased judicial activism, particularly amongst 
Ministers and the media, was leading to increased conflict between the judiciary and 
parliamentarians. It also (cautiously) suggested that the introduction of a form of 
confirmation hearing might go some way to redress the balance, without treading too 
heavily on the essential principle of judicial independence. 
While the judicial appointment system was comprehensively ‘modernised’ in 2005, 
none of the abovementioned issues were high on the agenda of reformers. Although 
some raised the issue of political or ‘democratic’ accountability (for example Sir 
Thomas Legg QC, Robert Hazell and Keith Ewing
5
), the focus of both the Government 
and the judges was on securing judicial independence. This became even more 
important following the botched prime ministerial attempt to abolish the historic office 
of the Lord Chancellor (sometimes viewed as the judges’ ‘protector’ in cabinet) without 
consultation. 
Accordingly, parliamentary involvement in the process was swiftly discounted, and 
executive interest was narrowed with a clear intention to establish an independent 
judicial appointments commission, as free as possible from political influence. While 
                                                 
4
 See for example: Bogadanor, V. Human Rights and the New British Constitution, Tom Sargant 
Memorial Lecture, 2009; Gearty, C. Are Judges Now Out of their Depth?, Tom Sargant Memorial 
Lecture 2008 
5
 See: e.g. Constitutional Affairs Committee, Judicial Appointments and a Supreme Court (court of 
final appeal), Session 2003-4, HC 48-II, where Sir Thomas Legg said: “I have expressed my 
preference for nominees for the new Supreme Court being confirmed by Parliament before the 
Prime Minister submits their names to the Queen for appointment. Whatever form the Parliamentary 
deliberations took, they would—and I think should—be public.” Robert Hazell argued: “[V]ery 
senior judicial appointees (Justices of the Supreme Court, and the four heads of division) should be 
invited by Parliament to present themselves for a scrutiny hearing. The committee would have no 
power of veto over the appointment. The main purpose of the hearing would be to introduce the new 
appointee to Parliament, and to give the committee the opportunity to develop a dialogue with the 
most senior judges on constitutional, legal and judicial policy”. See also: Ewing, K.D. A Theory of 
Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative Accountable and Independent Judiciary (2000) 
38 Alberta LR 708 
 6 
the Government worked hard to ensure that the new process was not completely 
dominated by the judiciary, by ensuring lay representation, it appeared to overlook the 
increasing tensions between the judiciary and parliamentarians (both within and outside 
Government). At that time, the Government had principled concerns that any political 
involvement in appointments could impact on the quality of appointees. In particular, 
the Lord Chancellor was keen to avoid any role for Parliament
6
, perhaps influenced by 
the often-disparaged US confirmation hearings process. Those who argued that it was a 
“delusion” that politics could be taken out of important decisions by entrusting them to 
quangos were broadly ignored.
7
 
Now that the new appointments system has had time to bed in, it appeared a suitable 
time to revisit some of these issues. This new thesis follows up on the work of the SPG 
paper, but will not rehearse the discussions contained in it in any detail. It will start by 
introducing some of the arguments around the issue of judicial accountability and how it 
should be defined (Chapter Two). It will go on to consider how the abovementioned 
constitutional changes might justify a re-examination of the traditional hostility towards 
methods of political accountability and whether new methods of accountability are 
indeed necessary. The thesis will also question whether the newfound respect for the 
doctrine of the separation of powers should preclude Parliamentary involvement in 
judicial appointments (Chapters Three and Four). It will assess the Government’s most 
recent reforms to the appointment system (particularly those taken forward in the Crime 
and Courts Act 2013 (Chapter Five). The thesis will examine whether the introduction 
of any form by political accountability in the context of judicial appointments would 
unduly interfere with judicial independence (both in the general context and specifically 
in the context of judicial appointments process).  
The second stage of the research will look at capabilities. At the same time the Labour 
Government was promulgating proposals for a new Bill of Rights and other 
constitutional reform under its Governance of Britain programme, it was also seeking to 
“strengthen the powers of Parliament”. It therefore introduced a new pre-appointment 
hearing system for appointments to quangos and other bodies. These new hearings were 
initially introduced during Gordon Brown’s premiership. As Kate Malleson and Robert 
                                                 
6
 Interview with Lord Falconer QC, September 2010 
7
 Cranston, R. Foreword to Horne, A. The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation 
Hearings? (Study of Parliament Group, London, January 2010) 
 7 
Hazell have noted, since 2008, parliamentary select committees have been scrutinising 
appointments to pre-eminent public bodies.
8
 They consisted of pre-appointment scrutiny 
hearings for the top 60 public appointments and were the subject of much debate. 
This system did not apply to the judiciary, but nonetheless looked very much like the 
judicial hearings model that had been introduced in Canada in 2006.
9
 Thus, while the 
UK Government conspicuously refused to accept any move towards pre-appointment 
hearings for the judiciary, there is at least a series of domestic examples as to how the 
UK Parliament might conduct any future hearings (and an important assessment as to 
whether it has the institutional capacity to undertake such work).  
The Parliamentary Liaison Committee, the Constitution Unit at University College 
London and the Institute of Government, have recently considered these scrutiny 
hearings, which are designed to focus on the candidates’ professional competence and 
independence.
10
 Concerns were raised that they would undermine the integrity of the 
public appointments process; or that Select Committees would seize upon the 
opportunity and engage in inappropriate lines of questioning. However, the research 
conducted by the Constitution Unit and the Institute for Government appears to 
demonstrate that such concerns were baseless. The perceived benefits of this new 
procedure (and whether it could be used as a useful method of judicial accountability) 
will be explored at Chapter Six. The second strand of the research will look at the 
implementation of these hearings and consider whether there are any objections (either 
in practice or principle) for importing them into our judicial appointments system. 
In addition to a consideration of the scholarly material already available on the issue of 
pre-appointment hearings, the author also interviewed some of those involved in the 
process at the time of the original reforms and thereafter, in order to gain an 
                                                 
8
 Malleson, K and Hazell, R. Increasing democratic accountability in the appointment of senior 
judges, UK Constitutional Law Group Blog, 15 July 2011 
9
 See for example Hogg. P, Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2006, (527-538); Gee. G. The Politics of 
Judicial Appointments in Canada in Judicial Appointments: Balancing Independence, 
Accountability and Legitimacy (A collection of essays prepared under the auspices of the Judicial 
Appointments Commission), pp 99-114 (London, 2010) and Paterson, A. and Paterson, C. Guarding 
the Guardians? Centre Forum, March 2012, Chapter 5 (available at: 
http://www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/guarding-the-guardians.pdf, last accessed 27 August 2013) 
10
 Constitution Unit, An Evaluation of Pre-Appointment Scrutiny Hearings, 9 February 2010 and 
Institute for Government, Balancing Act: The Right Role for Parliament in Public Appointments, 
March 2011 
 8 
understanding of the process that was adopted and the perceived limitations of 
Parliamentary involvement. The purpose of these interviews was essentially to enhance 
the author’s analysis and ensure that he had the opportunity to subject his thesis to 
external challenge by those involved in the decision making process. It also allowed for 
the assessment of some new (albeit limited) primary material on the UK judicial 
appointment system. The author would like to express his gratitude to Lord Falconer of 
Thoroton QC, Sir Thomas Legg QC, Sir Alan Beith MP, as well as two senior judges 
and several Parliamentary officials who prefer to remain anonymous. The author would 
also like to thank the House of Commons for part-funding the research undertaken in 
support of this thesis; Collette Rawnsley and Hélène Tyrrell, who kindly agreed to 
comment on drafts; and his supervisors, Professor Kate Malleson at the Queen Mary 
(University of London) and Professor Andrew Le Sueur (now at the University of 
Essex) for their encouragement and assistance throughout this project. 
This research is also informed, even if only subconsciously, by the decade that the 
author has spent working in Parliament, first as the legal specialist on the Constitutional 
Affairs Select Committee (during the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005); 
as the Senior Researcher on public law, human rights and counter-terrorism in the 
House of Commons Research Service in the House of Commons Library (2006-13); 
and, most recently, as Legal and Senior Policy Advisor at the House of Commons 
Scrutiny Unit.  
Although democratic accountability could have a number of different meanings (and 
encompasses the election of judges in some jurisdictions) given the United Kingdom’s 
general preference for representative democracy, this thesis will focus on the role of 
parliamentarians – and in particular, their role in the in the appointments process. 
Hence, references to ‘democratic accountability’ should be taken to mean accountability 
to elected parliamentarians. In the main, the emphasis will be on means of establishing 
accountability via the legislature; but where it is relevant, the thesis will also 
examinethe role of the executive in the judicial appointments process. 
Finally, it is worth noting that when considering the concept of judicial accountability, 
the author is really concerned with the most senior appointments and that this work does 
not touch upon the process for appointing judges below the level of the High Court, nor 
does it consider the appointment of tribunal judges or magistrates. The main focus will 
 9 
be on appointments to the Supreme Court (because of the importance of its decisions 
and its “policy making function”)11 and of appointments to managerial roles, such as the 
Lord Chief Justice and Heads of Division. 
                                                 
11
  Lord Justice Etherton, Uncorrect Oral Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution Inquiry into the Judicial Appointments Process, 13 July 2011, Q47. The “policy making 
function” of the Supreme Court will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3 
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Chapter 2: What Do We Mean by ‘Judicial Accountability’? 
Accountable: Adjective 
(1) Required or expected to justify actions or decisions; responsible: Ministers are 
accountable to Parliament … (Oxford English Dictionary) 
It seems strange to have to pose such a question. However, while there has been 
extensive academic commentary on the benefits of judicial control and judicial review 
on what is often described as an otherwise “unaccountable executive” 12, there appears 
to be far less thought given to the mechanisms that are in place to hold judges to 
account. Instead, far more consideration has been given to the issue of judicial 
independence – a subject which will be considered later in this thesis. This is 
unfortunate, since it is worth recognising that the peripheral research which does exists 
appears to suggest that accountability may well have some effect on judicial decision 
making.
13
 Dawn Oliver and Gavin Drewry have stated that, amongst other things, 
generally “accountability involves the idea that a person or body should give an 
account, or an explanation and justification for its acts.”14 They distinguish this from the 
concept of ‘responsibility’ – which they define essentially as taking the blame if 
something goes wrong.
15
 It might well be the case that the lack of wide ranging research 
into judicial accountability stems from a broad acceptance of the proposition that 
accountability is “a euphemism for control” and (in the context of this research) that an 
independent appointments commission is the preferred method of selecting judges 
because “it protects the judges from the excesses of democratic or popular selection.”16 
Taken to its furthest extreme, the concept of democratic accountability seems to raise 
fears (at least amongst members of the judiciary) of electing judges, or at the very least, 
                                                 
12
 To the extent that in some publications the term ‘judicial accountability’ sometimes appears to refer 
to judges holding the executive to account - see for example, Flinders, M. The Politics of 
Accountability in the Modern State, (Ashgate, 2001) p131 and Flinders, M. Mechanisms of Judicial 
Accountability in British Central Government, Parliamentary Affairs, (2001), 54 
13
 Besley, T. and Payne, A. Judicial Accountability and Economic Policy Outcomes: Evidence from 
Employment Discrimination Charges, Institute for Fiscal Studies, WP03/11, June 2003. However 
this research looks at the effect of the public election of judicial office holders rather than political 
involvement in appointments 
14
 Oliver, D. and Drewry G. The Law and Parliament in Oliver, D. and Drewry, G. (eds), The Law and 
Parliament (London, Butterworths, 1998) p10 
15
 Ibid 
16
 Beloff, M. Neither Cloistered Nor Virtuous? Judges and their Independence in the New Millennium, 
[2000] Denning Law Journal 153-172 at 171 
 11 
politically partisan confirmation proceedings.
17
 A typical response against the 
introduction of new methods of accountability might be that since judicial independence 
is a core value, allowing politicians a greater say in the selection of judges could 
threaten that independence. This should not be an end to the debate.
18
 
When considering the issue of judicial accountability, it is first necessary to distinguish 
between judicial accountability on the one hand and accountability for the judicial 
appointments process on the other. While the latter may well form part of judicial 
accountability in the broader sense, it is also worth questioning whether it can be 
considered separately.  
It is also necessary to consider who is accountable for selection decisions and to whom. 
Both the executive and Parliament have some responsibility for judicial accountability 
under the current system (introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) albeit that 
the role of the Lord Chancellor is now far less significant than it was previously. 
Although contested, the retention of a role for the Lord Chancellor in the appointments 
process (discussed further below) can clearly be justified. This is not only to secure 
accountability to Parliament through the usual convention of individual ministerial 
responsibility, but also to retain some political accountability (at least in relation to the 
appointment of senior judges). As for Parliament, it has the responsibility “to establish 
the statutory framework for the judicial appointments process.” Parliament “also has an 
accountability role to play in overseeing the process and reviewing the success or failure 
of its operation” and (therefore in holding the Lord Chancellor and Judicial 
Appointments Commission (JAC) to account).
19
 While the role of Parliament may seem 
quite limited, Parliament has retained the ultimate sanction – the power to dismiss 
senior judges. 
                                                 
17
 For a proponent of more radical change, see for example: Carswell, D. Time to democratise the 
judges? Douglas Carswell’s Blog 8 March 2011, where he notes the move towards elected police 
commissioners and argues a need for “democratic appointment hearings.” The need for greater 
“democratic accountability” (although not in relation to the judiciary) was a theme picked up by 
David Cameron prior to the General Election. See for example: Cameron, D. “A new politics: 
Democratic accountability”, The Guardian 25 May 2009. He outlined progress in this area in a 
subsequent speech, We will make government accountable to the people, delivered on 8 July 2010 
18
 For a counter-argument to this traditional view, see for example: Paterson, A. and Paterson, C. 
Guarding the Guardians? Centre Forum, March 2012  
19
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments, 25th Report of 
Session 2010–12, HL Paper 272, para 38 
 12 
American academic, Mary Clark, has identified a number of forms of accountability in 
the new UK judicial appointments system. These include: the fact that the members of 
the judicial appointment commissions are known, not secret; the judicial appointment 
commissions publicly advertise judicial vacancies (and post some limited information 
on their candidate selections on a public website); and, the Lord Chancellor is 
constrained in his discretion to review the recommendations of the judicial appointment 
commissions.
20
  
Both the executive and Parliament clearly feel that they can expect to hold the Judicial 
Appointments Commission for England and Wales to account for its performance. The 
JAC publishes detailed annual reports.
21
 Members of the JAC have also regularly 
appeared before the House of Commons Justice Committee (and previously the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee) to discuss the appointments process.
22
 Such 
appearances have not only focused on the efficiency of the process, but also on inputs 
(mainly the diversity of candidates and what can be done to encourage solicitors, 
minority candidates and women to apply for appointments). It is also worth noting that 
the preferred candidate to Chair the JAC is already subject to interview by the House of 
Commons Justice Committee. That Committee interviewed the current Chair of the 
JAC, Christopher Stevens, and endorsed his candidature in January 2011.
23
 
Parliamentarians also wish to have a continuing input into the selection criteria used by 
the JAC (for example, by modifying eligibility through statute, or by demanding that the 
JAC come up with policies to increase judicial diversity). Both of these activities impact 
upon the JAC’s decision making in respect of candidate selection, but neither appears to 
have been seen as a genuine threat to judicial independence. This is despite that fact that 
some would contend that an increase in diversity would necessarily impact on decision 
                                                 
20
 Clark, M. L. Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting Roles of the Legislature 
in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, Louisiana Law Review, 71, no. 2 (2011): 451-502 at 483 
21
  The Judicial Appointments Commission, a non-departmental public body sponsored by the Ministry 
of Justice, was established formally on 3
rd
 April 2006. Separate appointments for Scotland and 
Wales are made by respective national appointment commissions and appointments to the Supreme 
Court are made by a separate, ad hoc, commission, which is discussed in further detail below 
22
 See, e.g. Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, Judicial Appointments Commission, Oral 
Evidence 20 March and 20
th
 June 2007, HC 416 and Justice Select Committee, The Work of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission, 7 September 2010, HC 449-I 
23
 Justice Committee, Appointment of the Chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission, Second 
Report Session 2010-11, HC 770 
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making by the highest courts and that it is a “small p” political interference with 
appointments.
24
  
Erika Rackley has considered this issue having regard to the appointment of women 
judges, noting the well-known comments of US Supreme Court Justice, Sonia 
Sotomayor, that “a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more 
often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.” 
Rackley also noted that other women US Supreme Court judges made similar points – 
for example Ruth Bader Ginsberg has argued that being a woman helps a judge have a 
better understanding of the issues at stake in the case of sex and pregnancy 
discrimination.
25
 Although she recognises that empirical evidence supporting 
differences between male and female judges is, at best, “equivocal”, she nonetheless 
maintains that “once we accept that who the judge is matters, then it matters who our 
judges are.”26 
In the foreword to the book, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice, Baroness 
Hale considered the scholarly reworking of a selection of well-known cases from a 
feminist perspective. She posed the question: “What difference would it make if there 
were more feminist judges?” and concluded that while judges could not have an 
‘agenda’ to shape the law, that they could “certainly bring their own experience and 
understanding of life to the interpretation or development of the law or to its application 
in individual cases.”27 She observed that a feminist judge might set the story in a 
different context, or take different facts from the mess of detail, to tell the story in a 
different way. All of this suggests that proponents of judicial diversity might well be 
hoping for different outcomes in cases, which is surely a ‘political’ aim of sorts.28 
While the JAC is clearly supervised by both the executive and Parliament, there is, 
however, little obvious or significant democratic accountability in the appointment 
                                                 
24
 See, for example, Hunter, R. McGlynn, C. and Rackley, E. Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice (Hart, Oxford, 2010)  
25
 Rackley, E. Women, Judging and the Judiciary, (Oxford, Routledge, 2013) p167 
26
 Ibid, p142 and 164. For a more sceptical view on these issues, see: Lord Sumption, Home Truths 
about Judicial Diversity, Bar Council Law Reform Lecture, 15 November 2012 
27
 Hunter, R, McGlynn, C. and Rackley, E. Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice, (Oxford, 
Hart, 2010) Foreword 
28
 Another reason cited for appointing senior women judges is that of demonstrating leadership and a 
commitment to diversity – another small ‘p’ political criterion. See The Times, “If not now for a 
woman Lord Chief Justice, when?” 18 July 2013 and The Guardian, “Choice of Sir John Thomas as 
Lord Chief Justice sees tradition prevail”, 15 July 2013 
 14 
process itself – as Clark observes, there is no requirement that either the judicial 
appointment commissioners or Lord Chancellor actually be elected officials, although 
both may be held to account by number of parliamentary committees.
29
 
The traditional approach to judicial accountability more generally has been set out in 
some detail by Andrew Le Sueur, who has noted a series of formal and informal 
methods including: publication of an annual report by the court; rights of appeal to 
higher courts; academic commentary on particular judgments and the conduct of courts; 
scrutiny of the judicial appointments process; robust and accurate reporting on 
judgments in the news media; and, education by the Bar and other legal professional 
organisations.
30
 Le Sueur subdivided accountability into four different groups: ‘probity 
accountability’ (e.g. basic audit requirements; mechanisms to guard against the 
corruption of individual judges, or conflicts of interest); ‘performance accountability’ 
(e.g. focus on ‘delivery’ and ‘outcomes’ including management targets (which can be 
judged by way of annual reports); ‘process accountability’ (where public authorities are 
called upon “to explain and justify the decision making processes they adopt in carrying 
out their task”. In the judicial context, this could include explaining the methods used to 
select which cases to hear in full and the arrangements for the composition of benches 
in the appellate courts); and ‘content accountability’ (e.g. what the law is and what 
constitutional values a court ought to promote in its judgments). It is this last version of 
accountability which is the most challenging since, as Le Sueur observes, it is “here that 
the highest degree of ‘independence’ is expected.”31 
In relation to rights of appeal, it might be said that the existence of the Court of Appeal 
and Supreme Court serve as “an instrument of professional accountability – peer 
review, in a literal sense – for the judges below.”32 Thus the higher courts can act both 
as a form of “quality control in the administration of justice” and to provide a 
                                                 
29
 Particularly, the Justice Committee and the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
30
 Le Sueur, A. Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK in Morgan, D. (Ed) 
Constitutional Innovation – The Creation of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom; domestic, 
comparative and international reflections, (A special issue of Legal Studies, Butterworths, 2004), p 
80. See also: Le Sueur, A. Parliamentary accountability and the judicial system in Bamforth, N and 
Leyland, P (eds), Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming 2013) 
31
 Le Sueur, A. Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK, in Morgan, D. 
Constitutional Innovation: The creation of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom; domestic, 
comparative and international reflections, (London, LexisNexis, 2004, pp81-88 
32
 Blom-Cooper, L. and Drewry, G. The House of Lords and the English Court of Appeal, in The 
Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 Blom-Cooper, L, Dickson, B and Drewry, G. (eds), (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p49 
 15 
“mechanism of accountability in respect of those exercising judicial functions in the 
lower courts.”33 This type of self-regulation may give some candidates cause for 
concern when senior judges are also heavily involved in deciding on promotions to the 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The House of Lords Constitution Committee has 
recently considered the issue of judicial appraisal, suggesting that “a formal appraisal 
system should be introduced” but that it should be judge-led as “appraisal by an outside 
body could interfere with the independence of the judiciary.”34 It was not clear, from the 
evidence before the Committee, whether it would be beneficial to make use of such 
appraisals when judges applied for more senior appointments.
35
 
Other recent developments include appearances in television documentaries on the work 
of the Supreme Court and the televising of Supreme Court hearings (with the prospect 
of televised hearings or judgments in the lower courts to come).
36
 This has been 
combined with other communication strategies to enhance transparency (including a 
website, Twitter feed and an e-mail alerter about forthcoming judgments, as well as 
useful press releases to supplement the text of judgments, for those who only want the 
gist of a decision). Richard Cornes has contrasted this with the position that existed 
prior to the creation of the Supreme Court, noting that the Appellate Committee “had no 
dedicated communications operation. It released its judgments—collections of 
speeches—in accordance with parliamentary protocols, which to a non-lawyer onlooker 
when a Committee reported back to the House effectively disguised both its function in 
general, and the outcome of the decision in the case being decided.”37 Cornes recalls 
that the Appellate Committee “had no annual reports, and no articulated strategic 
objectives, relevant to communications or otherwise. It had no separate institutional 
identity; it was a ‘court’ yes, but a court which sat as a committee of Parliament.”38 
Judges may also use speeches or lectures to try to give an overarching constitutional 
theory to some of their decisions (the potential dangers of judicial speech-making are 
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discussed further in Chapter 4). These methods of accountability have been described as 
‘soft’ or narrative accountability and it has been said that such soft accountability “has 
fashioned a more transparent court that is much more energetic in giving an account of 
its judicial business and day-to-day operations.”39 
In spite of such increased transparency (and for obvious reasons), this remains a long 
way from the sort of ‘hard accountability’ that can be faced by politicians (and even 
civil servants) having to answer for decisions in front of opponents, or parliamentary 
committees. Vernon Bogdanor has sought to distinguish between these two different 
readings of accountability. He has contended that while it would be impossible for the 
judges to be subject to anything resembling ministerial accountability (which he defines 
as “sacrificial accountability” whereby ministers take the credit for what goes right in 
their department, and the blame for what goes wrong, to the extent that they are required 
to resign if something goes seriously wrong), this would not stop them being 
accountable in an “explanatory sense”. He defines this as accountability whereby the 
judges would be required to give “an account of their stewardship to Parliament”, by 
appearing before parliamentary committees after appointment and being questioned on 
their judicial approach.
40
  
Almost all would accept, in the words of Professor Anthony Bradley, that: “judicial 
independence requires that judges are not directly accountable either to the executive or 
to Parliament for their decisions.”41 Yet, it is also precisely the sort of soft 
accountability, described above, that brings the judiciary further into the public domain. 
After all, if the judiciary wishes the public to have a greater understanding of its work, it 
is unsurprising if the public also wants to have greater knowledge of who these judges 
actually are and how they were appointed. Cornes has noted that the greater 
transparency will also no doubt fuel press interest since the mainstream press “like 
stories about the justices which can be presented as accounts of ‘who’s up, who’s 
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down’, ‘who’s tipped to join the Court’, or ‘who might be the next President or 
Deputy.’”42 
A further move towards judicial accountability has seen judges appearing before select 
committees to discuss the legal impact of policy decision and the administration of 
justice more generally.
43
 However, Bogdanor’s views on accountability have been 
resisted by the judiciary. In recent years a number of members of the senior judiciary 
have expressed concerns about their need to be accountable to Parliament through the 
medium of select committees. When the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
concluded that select committees could play an important role in holding the judiciary 
to account by questioning judges in public, Lord Phillips observed that he did not find 
the phrase “attractive” since it suggested “subservience and a command and control 
relationship between the judiciary and Parliament”. He expanded on this by 
commenting that he did not “believe that it would be desirable for judges to appear to be 
at the beck and call of Parliament.”44 
Lest one think that this was simply a fit of pique, Sir Jack Beatson argued in a 
subsequent speech that: “the constitutional orthodoxy in the past, when there was less 
separation of powers than there is now, has been that Parliament, as the High Court of 
Parliament, has the power to summon judges”. While he did not seek to challenge the 
legal position directly, he stated that the “judiciary and the Lord Chief Justice” had 
concerns about the “frequency of these invitations” – in particular due to questions 
about partiality. He also claimed that appearances by judges before parliamentary 
committees in other Commonwealth common law jurisdictions were much less 
frequent. He went on to suggest that the increase in separation of powers and the 
“partisan nature of debates about the administration of justice” tended to suggest that it 
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might not be appropriate for judges to comment on certain matter upon which they have 
done so in the past.
45
  
These concerns were later echoed by the (then) Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger, 
who noted, in a lecture in 2012, the “increasing, and perhaps not entirely beneficial, 
tendency for members of the judiciary to be asked to give evidence to Parliamentary 
committees” and the fact that the judges “cannot offer such committees legal advice, 
just as they cannot provide the executive with legal advice.”46 Given that Members of 
the House of Lords cannot be compelled to attend at select committees, one might spot a 
certain irony in the fact that by ensuring their removal from the legislature, the most 
senior judges suddenly became, at least theoretically, compellable by Parliament. A 
further argument against the practice was raised by Lord Justice Toulson who wrote a 
note to Justice Minister, Lord McNally stating that: “Judges who are called before such 
committees may have views of their own which do not necessarily represent the views 
of the judiciary” arguing that “they may not be particularly well informed and it can be 
an easy temptation for them to become drawn into political areas.”47 Quite what 
methods the judiciary has, as an institution, to divine the “views of the judiciary” as a 
whole remains unclear, but the question becomes more relevant in circumstances where 
the senior judges take a more centralised approach.
48
 
In October 2012, the Judicial Executive Board published Guidance to Judges on 
Appearances before Select Committees. It conveyed much of the sense of unease 
suggested by the earlier judicial comment, although it did not go so far as challenging 
the ability of Parliament to summon judges. The guidance stated that appearances 
before Committees should be considered “exceptional” noting that “until the last quarter 
of the twentieth century there were virtually no appearances by judges before 
parliamentary committees.” The guidance provided for a very centralised procedure that 
envisaged requests for attendance going directly to the Private Office of the Lord Chief 
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Justice “for administrative convenience.” This is a change from past practice when 
Committees might approach a Head of Division or other senior judge (or a judge who 
acted in a representative capacity, such as the Secretary to the Association of District 
Judges) directly. The current guidance indicates that: 
25. In the unlikely event that agreement as to judicial attendance cannot be reached 
through informal channels and the select committee indicates it is unhappy with a 
proposed non-attendance or with a judge declining to answer particular questions, the 
Lord Chief Justice will be consulted. 
26. It is extremely unusual and very unlikely to be the case that a parliamentary 
committee will order a judge to attend.
49
 
It is evident that tensions can arise – a recent example relates to the request that Lord 
Justice Leveson attend the Culture, Media and Sport Committee following the 
publication of his report on media standards.
50
 It is worth noting, however, that this is a 
very unusual case, since it relates to the conduct and conclusions of a public inquiry, 
rather than a strictly judicial matter. John Whittingdale, the Chair of the Committee, was 
quoted in the Daily Telegraph as having said: “He chaired an inquiry which made 
recommendations to Parliament, it doesn’t seem unreasonable that Parliament asks him 
some questions about that.”51 
Clearly, if the judges have concerns about being summoned before parliamentary 
committees, they are also likely to feel that increasing accountability through an 
appointments process will impinge on their independence. Nonetheless, as was set out 
in The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings, a number of 
commentators have begun to express concern about the balance that has been struck.
52
 
In a recent submission to the Lords Constitution Committee, Alan Paterson has 
expanded on this argument, pointing out the need for an appropriate balance between 
judicial independence and accountability: 
If, as in this jurisdiction, we have, over the last 30 years, conferred more and more 
powers and responsibilities on the judiciary—and they have played a role in that—
                                                 
49
 Judicial Executive Board, Guidance to Judges on Appearances before Select Committees, October 
2012 (last accessed 15 March 2013). It is unclear how this Guidance relates to Supreme Court 
Justices 
50
  The Independent, “Lord Leveson refuses to be drawn into row on press regulation”, 10 October 2013 
51
 Daily Telegraph, “Lord Justice Leveson could appear in front of MPs within weeks”, 25 June 2013. 
See also, The Times, “Leveson invited to give evidence before MPs”, 26 June 2013 
52
 Horne A, The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings? Study of 
Parliament Group Paper No. 1 2010, p30 
 20 
and if we pushed for a separation of powers in place of the older balance of powers, 
then we have created a more powerful judiciary. Therefore you have an 
accountability problem that goes with that in a democracy, which of course has to 
balance the paramount need for judicial independence. So you have to hold these in 
tension. The best way of getting accountability involved in that tension is at the 
judicial appointments stage. So you need a balance between accountability and 
independence; it has to be a fair, open and transparent procedure and it has to be 
equal-opportunities appropriate.
53
 
Erika Rackley has stated that effective political oversight of the judicial appointments 
process, through an increased role for parliament, serves at least three purposes: 
First, the ‘overt political accountability’ it offers, particularly in the appointment and 
selection of the senior judiciary, enhances the democratic legitimacy of the 
appointments process. Second, to the extent that it leads to greater transparency, not 
only of the process itself but also of those appointed to the Bench – their motivations, 
values, competencies and so on – it increases public trust and confidence in the 
judiciary as a whole. Finally, insofar as greater political input in the appointment 
process reinforces public confidence in the legitimacy of the judiciary, this in turn 
strengthens the individual judge’s decision-making. It is suggested that while the US 
Supreme Court judges might not enjoy the confirmation hearing experience, their 
judicial position is reinforced by it.
54
 
Different levels of political accountability may be more appropriate depending upon the 
precise role of the judiciary and different branches of government can have a role. In a 
jurisdiction where the judges are the guardians of a written constitution, such as the 
United States, or Germany, one can see very direct political involvement in judicial 
appointments. A similar approach can be seen at the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg, where judges are elected, without undermining the rule of law.
55
 
Whether such methods are appropriate for a court without direct strike down powers
56
 is 
open to question and will be explored in more detail in later Chapters. The Canadian 
approach to judicial hearings, which appears very similar to our own parliamentary 
hearings for quango appointments, will also be mentioned briefly. 
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Chapter 3: Increasing Judicial Power 
The ultimate authority in the English Constitution is a newly-elected House of Commons 
(Bagehot)
57
 
If changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is (Richard Posner)
58
 
With a proper concept of what is meant by judicial accountability established, it is 
possible to consider why there is any case for change. Mechanisms for accountability 
are of obvious importance in all areas of good governance and, where there are shifts of 
power or responsibility, mechanisms for their control may require alteration. The 
changing role of the judiciary and the resulting effects provide a clear prompt for a 
review of judicial accountability. Be it disputes over asylum and immigration; terrorism 
legislation; or the need for a privacy law, the period since entry into force of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 has arguably seen more conflict between parliamentarians and the 
senior judiciary than any in recent memory.
59
 Many of these issues arise from the 
challenge of giving due regard to the ‘rule of law’ – a concept now accepted by most 
politicians (if resolutely undefined) – whilst seeking to maintain any concept of the 
Diceyean reading of Parliamentary sovereignty. It has been argued by some 
commentators that the United Kingdom is currently in a “transitional phase from 
parliamentary to constitutional democracy.”60 One consequence of this is that the 
constitution is becoming “increasingly juridified”.61 This can be seen to result in a 
gradual (but ratcheting) narrowing of the freedom of action of politicians and 
bureaucrats (whilst potentially increasing public accountability).
62
 Whilst this might 
once have seen a preoccupation of the tabloid press, today one can even find a Guardian 
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editorial conceding that liberals may “brush off the concern about unelected hands 
grabbing too much political power at their peril.”63 
The various challenges to Dicey’s doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament were set out 
in some detail in A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings and, hence, these 
arguments will not be rehearsed extensively here. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that it 
is broadly recognised that the passage of the European Communities Act 1972 and of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 have impacted heavily on Dicey’s once sacrosanct 
proposition. In addition to these obvious legislative restrictions on the supremacy of 
Parliament, members of the executive have also complained that their freedom of action 
is increasingly circumscribed by the decisions of the courts, due to the increase in scope 
and frequency of administrative law challenges.
64
 
Notwithstanding these substantive adjustments, there has also been, as Bogdanor has 
put it, a broader change, a “transformation of political questions into legal questions” 
and “historical questions of political philosophy into jurisprudential questions.”65  
This has no doubt been accelerated by the introduction of the Human Rights Act and 
discussions around whether it is a ‘constitutional statute’. These changes can also be 
traced back to the growth of judicial review in the 1960s and the passage of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981, which made judicial review more accessible. Indeed, it 
appears that the enlargement of the state and the desire of the state to use “law to realise 
notions of distributive justice” made it inevitable that the judiciary would be drawn into 
matters of political controversy.
66
 Flinders suggests that while previously friction had 
been avoided through a process of “non-provocation”, following the expansion of 
judicial review (and by the mid-1990s), “the judiciary had significantly extended the 
sphere of executive action that it was willing to rule on; and the relationship between 
the judiciary and the executive had deteriorated markedly (and often publicly).”67 
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In a compelling narrative that builds on arguments relating to judicial preference 
(perhaps first raised by John Griffith), Conor Gearty has argued that the expansion of 
judicial review, combined with the more recent constitutional changes, has resulted in a 
potential problem, namely that a new “hoop” – “does it please the judges” – is 
“hovering dangerously in the background, camouflaged by grandiose talk of the rule of 
law, principles of constitutionalism and disturbance to the constitutional order.”68  
The judiciary itself would not necessarily recognise this problem. In a speech given on 
the eve of his retirement in July 2013, the (then) Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, gave 
the typical response to this accusation: 
Judges themselves are governed by the rule of law which they are responsible for 
upholding without fear or favour. They cannot give judgments according to their 
personal whims or prejudices or preferences. They sometimes must give judgments 
contrary to their personal preferences, because that is what the law requires. The 
difficulties they have to face are not always appreciated. They are easily criticised, 
and cannot answer back.
69
 
Nonetheless, the issue has been recognised by some judges, albeit rather indirectly. 
Lord Justice Etherton, for example, has recently considered the way that a judge’s 
personal and moral philosophy can impact on judicial decision making, noting that what 
has changed with the Human Rights Act “are the size and importance of the gaps, left 
unfilled by common law precedent, where the personal outlook of judges and their 
political role feature much more prominently.”70 Cardozo explained this particularly 
eloquently with his reflection that: 
Every day there is borne in on me a new conviction of the inescapable relation 
between the truth without and the truth within. The spirit of the age, as it is revealed 
to us, is too often only the spirit of the group in which accidents of birth or education 
or occupation or fellowship have given us a place. No effort or revolution of the 
mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of these subconscious 
loyalties.
71
 
Sir Stephen Sedley has recognised the argument that “the courts are one of many 
locations in which politics are conducted” and has previously warned that there is every 
reason to suspect that the introduction of a Bill of Rights would “shift a further tranche 
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of political power to the judiciary”, arguing that under such a model (and, indeed, under 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights) “the 
criterion of what is ‘justifiable in a democratic society’ illogically transfers to an 
unelected judiciary the final say as to whether what an elected legislature has done is 
consistent with democracy.”72 
In his book, The Judge in a Democracy, the former President of the Supreme Court of 
Israel, Aharon Barak, acknowledged that “judicial philosophy is closely intertwined 
with the personal experience of the judge.” He went on to write that: 
It is influenced by his education and personality. Some judges are more cautious and 
others less cautious. There are judges that are more readily influenced by a certain 
kind of claim than are other judges […]. Every judge has a complex life experience 
that influences his approach to life, and therefore his approach to law. There are 
judges for whom considerations of national security or individual freedom are 
weightier than for other judges. There are judges whose personal makeup obligates 
order, and as a result, they require an organic development and evolution of the law. 
There are judges whose personalities place great importance on the proper solution, 
even if they reach that solution in a non-evolutionary way. There are judges whose 
starting point is judicial activism; there are judges whose starting point is self 
restraint. There are judges who give special weight to considerations of justice in the 
general sphere, even if it creates injustice in the individual case. Other judges 
emphasize justice in the individual case even if it does not fit with the general justice 
at the basis of the norm. 
One must always remember that this judicial philosophy – the fruit of the judge’s 
personal experience – is relevant in the realm in which the judge has discretion. It 
functions only within a range of reasonableness. It works only in cases where the 
legal problem has more than one legal solution.
73
 
American Circuit Judge and academic, Richard Posner, has underscored the dangers of 
politicisation when considering the replacement of a judge on the US Supreme Court 
with another who had more trenchant and defined views (and the effect this had on 
outcomes). Posner observed that the change demonstrated the “personal and political 
elements in judging” and noted, worryingly, that “if changing judges changes law, then 
it is not even clear what law is.”74 
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Politics in Law: Campaigning and Politicisation 
As well as the vagaries of judicial philosophy, it is also clear that many Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other pressure groups try to use court 
processes, such as judicial review, as an extension of their campaigning work.
75
 This 
may be a perfectly legitimate way of highlighting poor administrative decision making; 
however, the Government expressed concerns about this in 2012, launching a 
consultation which aimed to restrict what it described as “weak” and “hopeless” cases.76 
The Ministry of Justice consultation paper said that the government was concerned that 
“the Judicial Review process may in some cases be subject to abuses, for example, used 
as a delaying tactic, given the significant growth in its use but the small proportion of 
cases that stand any reasonable prospect of success.”77 
The consultation paper also noted the growth in claims for judicial review: “In 1974, 
there were 160 applications for Judicial Review, but by 2000 this had risen to nearly 
4,250, and by 2011 had reached over 11,000” (although it recognised that over three 
quarters of these claims related to asylum and immigration).
78
 The consultation was 
heavily criticised
79
 (a typical response complained that it was “riddled with 
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unsubstantiated allegations sitting awkwardly alongside admissions about the lack of 
supporting evidence at the Government’s disposal”).80  
In spite of this, in April 2013, the Government published a response announcing that a 
number of the restrictions suggested in the original consultation would be taken 
forward.
81
 There was further alarm following the publication of a separate Ministry of 
Justice consultation, entitled Transforming Legal Aid, Delivering a more credible and 
efficient system (CP14/2013). The Ministry of Justice argued that the legal aid reforms 
proposed would “not prevent legal aid being granted for future judicial reviews” but 
said that it was “concerned that currently legal aid is being used to fund weak JRs which 
do not receive a court’s permission to proceed, and so have little effect other than to 
incur unnecessary costs to the taxpayer.”82 
The Judicial Executive Board sent a collective response to the second consultation 
which could be seen to be critical of many of the Government’s proposals and their 
potential effect on the legal profession.
83
 
Recently, concerns have also been raised by some commentators about the use of s 149 
of the Equality Act 2010 (the public sector equality duty). In particular, it has been 
suggested that activists allow the impression that the courts can be used for “nakedly 
political ends”, even where the courts themselves have been reticent. 84 Lord Justice 
Laws recognised this concern in the case of R (on the application of MA and others) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and another
85
, a challenge against what critics 
referred to as the “bedroom tax”. 
He observed that: 
The cause of constitutional rights is not best served by an ambitious expansion of 
judiciary territory, for the courts are not the proper arbiters of political controversy. It 
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is in this sense that judicial restraint is an ally of the s 149 duty, for it keeps it in its 
proper place, which is the process and not the outcome of public decisions. I would 
with respect underline what was said by Elias LJ at para 78 in Hurley, rejecting a 
submission for the claimants that it was for the court to determine whether 
appropriate weight has been given to the duty: “it would allow unelected judges to 
review on substantive merits grounds almost all aspects of public decision making.” 
Mark Bevir has contended that when the application of a rule is given over to courts, 
citizens “have an incentive to try to get their way on that issue by employing a lawyer, 
rather than by in engaging in democratic politics.”86 Phillip Sales has suggested that 
when one is disenchanted with political life, which can be subject to moral panics, 
disproportionate and other over hasty decisions and potentially dangerous populism, 
“the relative insulation of the courts from popular political pressure seems attractive.”87 
The result of all of this is that, when the will of politicians is thwarted by the courts, 
questions about judicial accountability are frequently posed by Ministers and 
backbenchers alike.
88
 
Nonetheless, it is worth recognising that political responses to these questions have been 
somewhat muddled. Politicians, whether members of the executive or backbench 
Members of Parliament, often appear to have little time for checks and balances on their 
power.
89
 Criticism of judges, whether domestic, from Strasbourg, or the courts of the 
European Union, is often fierce and no longer seems to be moderated by the 
conventions of old. Reporting of these conflicts in the press is often inaccurate or 
inflammatory. Moreover, recent responses, such as efforts to make rights “more 
British”; balance them with responsibilities; or, “bring rights back home”90 do not 
necessarily address the crux of the difficulties which often come back to the question of 
who has the final word on the law – elected politicians or judges.  
Finally, it is worth noting that these are not concerns that have only been voiced by 
those on the right of the political spectrum. Former Justice Secretary and Lord 
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Chancellor, Jack Straw, has recorded in his memoirs that an obstacle to the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights was the fear that it would 
give courts the power to override the sovereignty of Parliament. He noted that “the 
tribal sentiment inside the Labour party at the time inclined us to distrust the judiciary, 
who were, in this not wholly accurate view, regarded as reactionary elements of the 
British Establishment.”91 
The Judiciary and the Law Making Process 
The abovementioned concerns are all worthy of some consideration; and many of them 
stem, at least in part, from the age-old question about the extent to which the judiciary is 
involved in the law making process. It has been suggested that one reason that 
Parliament did not press for any role in the judicial appointments process during the 
passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is due to the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy. That is to say that there was no perceived need for Parliament to shape the 
courts through participation in judicial appointments – “as final arbiter of the law, 
Parliament could override any decision of the Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords.”92 This Diceyan view that the practice of the common law does not really 
contradict the supremacy of Parliament (as judicial legislation is subordinate) is now 
open to increasing doubt.
93
 
In response to recent complaints (and particularly where cases raise Convention rights, 
or relate to equality duties), the judges often state that they are simply fulfilling duties 
imposed on them by Parliament. One clear example is the transformation of Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into a privacy law, to be deployed 
(usually) against the tabloid press. In response to any criticism, the judges will often put 
forward the excuse that “we apply the human rights act because that is what Parliament 
has instructed us to do.”94 In terms of the development of a privacy law, this rather 
ignores the fact that the main Strasbourg cases developing the law of privacy occurred 
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well after the enactment of the Human Rights Act, and arguably fell rather more into the 
“living instrument” school of thought, which has not necessarily received political 
endorsement.
95
  
This doctrine, which dates back to the case of Tyrer v United Kingdom
96
 essentially 
means that the courts will interpret the Convention according to present-day conditions, 
despite the fact that interpretation they reach might not have accorded with the views of 
the original drafters. Even direct proponents of the living instrument, or “living tree” 
doctrine, such as Baroness Hale, have concluded that there are “some natural limits” to 
its growth and development. Otherwise there is a fear that the judgments of the 
domestic and Strasbourg courts “will increasingly be defied by our governments and 
Parliaments.”97 However, whilst Baroness Hale acknowledged a need to leave some 
matters to Parliament, she took the view that this was not down to the fact that 
Parliament was more democratic than the courts (since “the courts are just as essential 
to a democracy based on the rule of law as is Parliament”), but rather down to the more 
pragmatic issue of “institutional competence” (discussed further below). 
In the case of the privacy debate, not only has the judiciary seemed to give little weight 
in their judgments to Parliament’s views (expressed in Section 12(4) of the Human 
Rights Act) that “the court must, inter alia, have particular regard to the importance of 
the Convention right to freedom of expression” (my emphasis)98, but once the courts 
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have expressed their views on the appropriateness of these types of privacy laws as a 
fundamental human right under the Convention, it becomes rather difficult (at the very 
least politically, but also practically) for the Government to pass legislation to the 
contrary.
99
 
A New Approach to Cases Involving National Security 
A good example of an area which has caused conflict between the judiciary and the 
executive is the courts’ approach to national security cases. A long series of cases (until 
2001) had demonstrated the reluctance of the courts to interfere where the Government 
had argued that national security was in play.
100
 
In the case of Hosenball, Lord Denning said “our history shows that, when the state 
itself is endangered, our cherished freedoms may have to take second place. Even 
natural justice itself may suffer a setback. Time after time Parliament has so enacted and 
the courts have loyally followed.” More recently, in the case of Rehman, Lord 
Hoffmann observed that: 
What is meant by “national security” is a question of construction and therefore a 
question of law […]. On the other hand, the question of whether something is “in the 
interests” of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and 
policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, 
decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are 
not a matter for judicial discretion. They are entrusted to the executive.
101
 
Since then, there has been what can only be described as a sea change in approach, 
following the case of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
102
 Lord 
Bingham, who gave the leading judgment, considered a statement by the Attorney 
General that: 
                                                                                                                                               
article 9, section 13 of the 1998 Act does not give greater weight to those rights than they would 
otherwise enjoy under the Convention.”   
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37. […] It was for Parliament and the executive to assess the threat facing the nation, 
so it for those bodies and not the courts to judge the response necessary to protect the 
security of the public. These were matters of a political character calling for an 
exercise of political and not judicial judgment. 
He rejected this argument, concluding that: 
42. […] The function of independent judges, charged to interpret and apply the law is 
universally recognised as a cardinal function of the modern democratic state, a 
cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist 
on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial 
decision making as in some way undemocratic […] The 1998 [Human Rights] Act 
gives the courts a very specific, wholly democratic mandate. As Professor Jowell has 
put it “The courts are charged by Parliament with delineating the boundaries of a 
rights based democracy. 
This judgment, in what is commonly referred to as the Belmarsh case (since it related to 
the detention, without trial, of non-national terror suspects who could not be deported – 
mainly at Belmarsh high security prison), might have been seen by some as a judicial 
response to some of the perceived excesses which had come about at the height of the so 
called “War on Terror”. Jack Straw appeared to see it that way, describing the judgment 
as a judicial “backlash”.103 Certainly, the Belmarsh case has been seen as a key 
development in the courts asserting the rule of law and being less deferential to the 
views of the executive on this subject.
104
 
After the judgment in the Belmarsh case, it might be thought that the domestic courts 
seemed more reticent to interfere in subsequent national security cases, finding for the 
Government in a series of cases, perhaps feeling that their point had been made.
105
 Yet, 
the genie was out of the bottle, and in spite of the more conservative views of the UK 
courts, the European Court of Human Rights proceeded to find against the Government 
in a series of cases relating to: the use of secret evidence; stop and search powers; and, 
the deportation of a notorious terror suspect (Abu Qatada) where there was a risk that 
torture evidence might be deployed against him.
106
 Some of these Strasbourg judgments 
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were later considered and upheld (not always enthusiastically) by the domestic courts – 
much to the consternation of the Government.
107
 
It is interesting to ponder what the effect of such judgments might have been had they 
been applied in the past (and whether the lawyers and judges who these days may have 
little first-hand experience of such issues, always know best).  
Who Should have the Final Word on the Law? 
The issue as to who has the final word is particularly concerning in circumstances where 
society at large believes that the courts have struck the wrong balance. In the UK, while 
Parliament legally retains the final say under the 1998 Act, the politics of the situation 
can be very difficult. While Parliament can theoretically intervene to correct the law, 
practical difficulties may arise if such an intervention would be deemed by the courts to 
infringe a Convention right. Commenting on a similar picture in Canada, Lorne Neudorf 
has argued that the “dialogue” that is meant to exist “is sometimes more like a judicial 
monologue given political reluctance to challenge judicial decisions that hold rhetorical 
advantages, particularly in human rights cases.”108  
This criticism has been echoed by political scientist, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, who 
has said that while the Human Rights Act protected the formality of parliamentary 
sovereignty, “Parliament has the last say, but only if it submits to the views of the 
judges.” Pinto-Dushinsky argues that in circumstances where a court issues a 
declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act, “if Parliament refuses to 
introduce legislation to remove the incompatibility, any person can then bring a case 
against the UK before the Strasbourg court in the almost sure knowledge that 
Strasbourg will decide against the UK.”109 Anthony Bradley has contended that: “A 
declaration of incompatibility leaves a United Kingdom statute mortally wounded, and a 
government that proceeds as if it were not does so at its peril.”110 And, in a more 
                                                 
107
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF No. 3 [2009] UKHL 28 in which Lord Rodger 
observed “In reality we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum – Strasbourg has 
spoken, the case is closed.” (at para 98) 
108
 Neudorf, L. The Supreme Court and new judicial independence, Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law (2012) 1(2), 25-43 at 41 
109
 Pinto-Duschinsky, M. The Hijacking of the Human Rights Debate, Standpoint Magazine, May 2012 
110
 Bradley, A. Publication Review: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act [2011] 
Public Law 203 at 206. For an up to date list of how the Government has responded to the 28 
declarations of incompatibility (of which only 20 were upheld on appeal) see: London School of 
Economics, Human Rights Futures Project: Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human 
 33 
philosophical vein, as Bogdanor has suggested, rights “purport to provide final answers” 
and “when someone says ‘I have a right’ that really ends the argument. It takes the 
argument out of politics.”111  
As noted above, commentators often focus on the issue of whether Parliament can 
ignore a declaration of incompatibility. What could prove just as contentious as mere 
inaction would be if Parliament sought to introduce (or amend) legislation where the 
courts had already clearly indicated this would infringe Convention rights (for example: 
explicitly worded legislation to overrule the impact of Chahal v UK and subsequent 
judgments, to allow the Home Office to deport terror suspects to countries where there 
was a real risk that they would suffer torture).
112
 In those circumstances, Roger Smith, 
the former director of the NGO JUSTICE, has observed that the likely legal 
consequence would be that an application would be made to the European Court of 
Human Rights “whose decision the government was bound by treaty to implement.”113 
There would also be a strong political cost, as Lord Hoffmann recognised in R v Home 
Secretary, ex p Simms, when he said: 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary 
to fundamental principles of human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 will not 
detract from this power. The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are 
ultimately political not legal. But the principle of legality means that Parliament must 
squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights 
cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is a great 
risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed 
unnoticed in the democratic process.
114
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It is evident that we have moved on from a situation in which judges were simply 
holding ministers to account “for the lawful exercise of the powers conferred upon them 
by Parliament” since they are now also “holding them accountable against judicial 
interpretations of very abstract rights” which have become a new form of judge made 
law.
115
 Hence, whilst one interpretation may be that the judges have done no more than 
give an interpretation of a law that Parliament has passed, others may form the view that 
the judiciary is clearly not only engaged in both policy and lawmaking, but also that it 
can sometimes have the final say on issues.
116
 This conclusion is bolstered by recent 
comments from the (then) Lord Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, who has said that “if 
Parliament disagrees with a judgment, it is open to Parliament to consider reforming the 
law, but as long as we remain bound by the Convention on Human Rights, we cannot 
reform the law in a way that does not conform with our obligations under the 
Convention.”117 
Lord Justice Etherton has controversially suggested that there is a fundamental 
difference between the top two courts (the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) and the 
lower courts in this context because, as he put it: 
The top two courts, the Supreme Court in particular, is now primarily a policy-
making body over a much wider area than it ever was. Professor Bogdanor has 
referred quite rightly to the “New British Constitution” […] This has totally changed 
the relationship between the policy-making judiciary in the highest two courts and 
Parliament. The judges are not accountable in relation to that policy-making element. 
This is what is critical.
118
  
In part, the defensive comments from judges sound like a retreat to the past, since they 
echo an earlier age. As Pannick recognised in his 1987 text, Judges, until the 1960s, the 
judiciary was prone to deceive itself by suggesting that it merely applied the law made 
by Parliament and that the job of the judges was only to interpret the law.
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in 1953, Lord Denning noted that it was “almost heresy” to admit that judges make law 
every day.
120
 
There was subsequently a clear rejection of this ‘declaratory theory’ of law, given plain 
recognition by Lord Reid in 1972, when he said that: 
There was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that judges make 
law—they only declare it. Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that 
in some Aladdin’s cave there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour and that 
on a judge’s appointment there descends on him some magic knowledge of the words 
Open Sesame. Bad decisions are given when the judge has muddled the pass word 
and the wrong door opens. But we do not believe in fairy tales anymore.
121
  
Yet in spite of these moves, many of today’s judges have sometimes been reluctant to 
declare with the same clarity as Lord Radcliffe that “there was never a more sterile 
controversy than that upon the question whether a judge makes laws.”122 This has 
become a particular issue with decisions taken pursuant to claims under the Human 
Rights Act. A further example of this reticence can be seen in Lord Justice Maurice 
Kay’s evidence on the Human Rights Act during a joint session of the (then) 
Constitutional Affairs Committee and Home Affairs Committee. Although he argued 
that judges had not simply arrogated power to themselves, he went on to contend that: 
Whilst some judicial decision-making is discretionary, decision-making in most of 
the controversial cases on human rights is not. For example, whether a domestic 
statute is Convention-compliant, whether the terms of a control order amount to a 
lawful restriction of liberty or an unlawful deprivation of liberty, whether detention 
without trial of foreign terrorism suspects is disproportionate and/or discriminatory, 
whether the denial of asylum support to an applicant for asylum pending the 
determination of his claim amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment, are all 
issues requiring judicial decision by the application of the law to the facts of the case. 
That is a matter of judgment according to the law, not discretion.
123
 
Many would consider that to be a controversial statement indeed.
124
 The decisions may 
not be discretionary per se, but they certainly involve a careful balancing of competing 
interests. Moreover, the statement appears to show a worrying lack of self-awareness as 
to how a judge’s personal views might colour his or her interpretation of the law when 
                                                 
120
 Zander, M. The Law Making Process, 6
th
 Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p361 
121
 Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker (1972) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22 
122
 Lord Radcliffe, Not in Feather Beds (London, 1968), p 271  
123
 HC 1554-I (Session 2005-06), 31 October 2006, Q67 
124
 For an informative rebuttal to the proposition that hard cases have a single, correct, solution on the 
basis of existing legal rules and principles, see, for example: Paterson, A, The Law Lords 
(MacMillan, 1982), pp 193-4  
 36 
carrying out that balancing exercise, particularly in the type of ‘hard cases’ heard in the 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.
125
 One member of the Supreme Court, Lord 
Sumption, recently observed that “there are some on the [Supreme Court] whose views 
you can guess at and be right more often than not” arguing that there was “an obvious 
schism between the natural parsons who tend to look at issues in moral terms and the 
pragmatic realists.”126 
In the 1970s and 1980s it could be argued that, in spite of the rise of judicial review, 
there were still significant limits to judicial law making
127
 and that Parliament continued 
to retain the final word. Under the Human Rights Act, things are not so clear. Long 
gone are the days in which Lord Reid was able to draw a distinction between judicial 
law making where “we are dealing with ‘lawyers’ law’” and those cases where the 
courts were not to proceed on their own view of public policy: 
[C]ases where we are dealing with matters which directly affect the lives and the 
interests of large sections of the community and which raise issues which are the 
subject of public controversy and on which laymen are as well able to decide as are 
lawyers.
128
  
Lord Dyson MR has considered the distinction more recently when addressing the issue 
of the limits of legitimate development of the common law by the judges in a speech 
Where The Common Law Fears to Tread.
129
 He noted the well-known decision of Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority ex p 
B
130
 around the issue of institutional competences
131
 and also recognised that the UK’s 
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adversarial system of advocacy is not always well suited to assisting the court to arrive 
at the best solution on policy decisions. He contended that it was still the case that 
precedent would suggested that it was the “common law rules which might be described 
as ‘lawyer’s law—such as witness immunity or mistake of law—that judges are most 
ready to develop.” Yet, he also recognised the issue of “judicial temperament”, stating 
that: 
It is an inescapable fact that some judges are more conservative than others. Some 
are cautious and prefer to paddle in the warm and safe shallows of clear precedent. 
Others are more adventurous and are prepared to give it a go in the more treacherous 
waters of the open sea. 
These issues prove more contentious when considering areas of law in which a well-
educated layman might feel qualified to express an opinion – such as questions of the 
proportionality of Government actions under the Human Rights Act. Jonathan 
Sumption, in a speech given prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court, noted the 
gradual extension of what were perceived to be “fundamental rights” that would justify 
judicial interference and accepted that there was a risk of the judiciary overextending its 
reach. He suggested that in some cases one could readily identify a tendency on the part 
of judges to form a view on the merits of an underlying policy under challenge and 
argued that: 
There is no escaping the fact that there are issues on which the problem is not so 
much a lack of clarity in the expression of Parliament’s will as a radical difference 
between the collective instincts of the judiciary and those of politicians facing the 
usual electoral pressures.
132
 
One irony is that, while Parliamentary sovereignty continues to ensure that Parliament 
can easily overrule the courts on issues of lawyer’s law, sometimes for politically 
expedient reasons (and despite the fact the court may clearly have the expertise in 
developing the law in a given area
133
), this is rather less straightforward when questions 
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around rights are in play – despite the fact that far more straightforward matters may be 
under discussion and fair minded people could reasonably disagree on the conclusions 
reached. 
The Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty 
While it may not be entirely fair to compare decision making under the Human Rights 
Act with the development of the common law, these questions are important because 
they go straight to the heart of the judicial role in law-making. As Professor Zander 
recognised, well before the introduction of the 1998 Act, English judges have been 
discreet about their legislative or creative role, perhaps on the grounds that “Parliament 
and the people are willing to tolerate the present exercise of executive power by judges 
because they do not wield the power openly”.134 Lord Scarman acknowledged this point 
straightforwardly in the case of Duport Steel Ltd v Sirs: 
The constitution’s separation of powers, or more accurately, functions, must be 
observed if judicial independence is not to be put at risk. For if people and 
Parliament come to think that the judicial power is to be confined by nothing other 
than the judges sense of what is right (or, as Seldon put it, by the length of the 
Chancellor’s foot) confidence in the judicial system will be replaced by fear of it 
becoming uncertain and arbitrary in its application. Society will then be ready for 
Parliament to curb the power of the judges.
135
 
Any judicial reticence can now be balanced with some rather bolder statements, 
articulated most clearly in the case of Jackson and others v Her Majesty’s Attorney 
General
136
, which considered the legality of the Hunting Act. Over the course of the 
judgment, Lord Steyn stated that, while it remained the general principle of our 
constitution, “the classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the 
modern United Kingdom.” He was moved to claim that it was a construct of the 
common law, a principle created by judges, noting that: “If that is so, it is not 
unthinkable that circumstances could arise when the courts might have to qualify a 
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principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism.”137 Baroness Hale 
stated that “the courts will treat with particular suspicion (and might even reject) any 
attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing governmental action affecting the rights 
of the individual from all judicial powers”138; whilst Lord Hope observed that: 
Our constitution is dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. But Parliamentary 
sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. It is not uncontrolled in the sense 
referred to by Lord Birkenhead LC in McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 720. It 
is no longer right to say that its freedom to legislate admits of no qualification 
whatever. Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute 
legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone 
is being qualified.
139
  
While these statements may not be quite as contentious as those expressed by Sir 
Edward Coke in Dr Bonham’s case (1610) (where he suggested that the courts might 
declare Acts of Parliament void under the common law)
140
; nonetheless, this is all a far 
cry from when Sir Thomas Bingham (as he then was) suggested, in a lecture in 1994, 
that: 
If Parliament were clearly and unambiguously to enact, however improbably, that a 
defendant convicted of a prescribed crime should suffer mutilation, or branding, or 
exposure in a public pillory, there would be very little that a judge could do about it, 
except resign.
141
 
The obiter remarks in Jackson did not, in fact, meet with Lord Bingham’s approval. In a 
book on the rule of law, published shortly before his death, he wrote that he could not 
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accept that his colleagues’ observations were correct, arguing that while the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty could not be ascribed to statute, “it does not follow that the 
principle must be a creature of the judge-made common law which the judges can 
alter.” He added: “the judges did not by themselves establish the principle and they 
cannot, by themselves, change it [...] The British people have not repelled the 
extraneous power of the papacy in spiritual matters and the pretensions of royal power 
in temporal in order to subject themselves to the unchallengeable rulings of unelected 
judges.”142 When he was Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger also expressed his 
support for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in a speech entitled Who are the 
Masters Now?, stating that: 
While our constitutional settlement has been in one of its periodic reform phases over 
the last two decades, the idea that Parliament is no longer legally sovereign and that 
the judiciary, whether at home or in Strasbourg, are the masters now is quite simply 
wrong.
143
 
Bingham’s concerns were also reflected by Sir Ross Cranston (a former Solicitor 
General and current High Court Judge), who recently wrote of the “worrying opinion of 
some senior judges that the courts have power to strike down an Act of Parliament if it 
violates fundamental constitutional principles (defined, as would be the case, by the 
judges).” He argued that: 
This is a profoundly anti-democratic doctrine, not least because it does not 
incorporate the parliamentary override (perhaps with special procedures) or a 
reversal by popular referendum, which are a feature of jurisdictions with 
constitutional courts.
144
 
In spite of the perceived benefits many would accept result from the move towards a 
rights based democracy, there is also a need for legitimacy – judges cannot simply usurp 
power from the elected element. Not only do judges have to consider what authority 
gives them the legal and moral power to legislate increasingly in wide policy areas, but 
they also have to consider whether the public accepts that they are exercising their 
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powers legitimately. This latter point is not to say that the judges should bend to every 
public whim. The words of Lord Mansfield CJ still ring true today:  
I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, upon occasion, to gain the 
huzzas of thousands or the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press: I 
will not avoid doing what I think is right, though it should draw on me the whole 
artillery of libels.
145
  
Senior judges, however, do need to consider the legitimacy of other institutions, such as 
Parliament, and their own limitations (as has been observed elsewhere, judges are not 
expert in the formulation of policy at national or local level, nor the formulation of 
economic policy).
146
 Lord Justice Etherton has acknowledged that one cannot have an 
“effective rule of law unless the law is complied with by virtue of respect for the law 
and those who administer it.”147 As Hayek suggests, if the idea of the rule of law “is 
represented as an impractical and even undesirable ideal and people cease to strive for 
its realisation, it will rapidly disappear.”148 Accordingly, it is essential for judges to 
carry legitimacy within society. As Vernon Bogdanor has argued:  
Surely parliamentary and popular approval is also required for any alteration in the 
fundamental norm by which we are governed. At the present time, politicians clearly 
would not agree to give judges the power that it appears some seek, to supersede the 
sovereignty of Parliament.
149
  
In the US context, Richard Posner has articulated a similar concern, stating that: 
Political democracy in the modern sense means a system of Government in which the 
key officials stand for election at relatively short intervals and thus are accountable to 
the citizenry. A judiciary that is free to override the decisions of these officials 
curtails democracy.
150
 
While the judges are clearly no longer “lions under the throne”, the precise demarcation 
of their duties and functions is currently in some degree of flux. As the only completely 
unelected branch of Government, it is certainly true that the judicial branch is well 
placed to resist populism and uphold the rule of law, but as an institution, it is also 
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lacking in diversity and does not represent the population at large. This latter point led 
Dame Brenda Hale (as she then was) to suggest that a more gender balanced judiciary 
was important in terms of democratic legitimacy as: 
[J]udges are set in authority over others and can sometimes wield enormous power 
over individuals and businesses. In a democratic society, in which we are all equal 
citizens, it is wrong in principle for that authority to be wielded by such an 
unrepresentative bunch.
151
 
She is not the only judge voice these concerns. In 1994, Sir Stephen Sedley commented 
that “the judiciary comes very largely from a tranche of society whose values, culture, 
données and attitudes are homogeneous because they are socially and educationally 
inbred.”152 Lord Neuberger confirmed that little had changed in 2011, accepting that 
most judges remained “white, public school men”.153  
In written evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Professor Cheryl 
Thomas recently commented that a lack of legitimacy is one of the reasons that elected 
officials ought to be included in the judicial appointments process: 
The legitimacy of unelected individuals—judges—to adjudicate on the laws passed 
by elected officials requires that elected officials are in some way involved, 
particularly in the appointments process.
154
 
Professor Kate Malleson has contended that the “corrosive impact” of the absence of 
certain under-represented groups (such as women, solicitors and minority lawyers) has a 
significant effect on the legitimacy of the senior judiciary.
155
 It has been suggested that 
the current appointment system has, in effect, removed one of the potential strategies for 
increasing diversity that has been used in other jurisdictions, namely political 
leadership.
156
 How the homogony within the profession impacts on both legitimacy and 
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judicial decision-making has been canvassed extensively elsewhere
157
 and will also be 
touched upon briefly later in this work. 
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Chapter 4: The Separation of Powers 
Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in those it is not 
always found. It is only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows 
us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as 
far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits? 
To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should 
be a check to power. (Montesquieu)
158
 
Beyond a general discussion around checks and balances,
159
 the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, originally associated with Montesquieu and subsequently 
enshrined in a different form in the US Constitution, can be somewhat elusive. The 
classic formulation – that there are three distinct and separate functions of government 
that should be discharged by three separate entities: the legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary, which should not co-mingle – has never been observed in the United 
Kingdom.
160
 As Sir Henry Brooke has noted, not only is there the fact that until recently 
our most senior judges sat with the legislature, in addition, officials within the executive 
branch of government (such a planning inspectors and social security adjudicators) 
continue to perform functions which may appear quasi-judicial to some purist 
observers.
161
 Other examples of how the different branches of government work 
together include the fact that judges are regularly seconded to chair the Law 
Commission
162
 (which advises on law reform) and to chair independent inquiries (an 
issue which will be touched on further below). At the time of the constitutional reforms 
which led to the creation of the Supreme Court, and the reform of the office of Lord 
Chancellor, Kate Malleson quite reasonably stated that the “legitimacy of the 
institutional arrangements governing the judiciary’s relationship with the other branches 
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of government has traditionally been measured by its effectiveness in securing judicial 
independence rather than their conformity to a constitutional ideal model.”163 
Roger Masterman has recently suggested that (following the implementation of the 
Human Rights Act and the Constitutional Reform Act) there are now two distinct 
perspectives from which the contemporary separation of powers can be approached – 
either through the separation of, or distinctiveness of, governmental functions, or 
through the institutional divides or interactions amongst the three branches of 
Government.
164
 He contends that the most visible change in the latter respect can be 
found in the increased institutional separation brought about by the 2005 Act.
165
 
However, the most pragmatic (and attractive) approach still appears to be the one given 
by Eric Barendt, namely that: “the separation of powers should not be explained in 
terms of a strict distribution of functions between the three branches of government, but 
in terms of a network of rules and principles which ensure that power is not 
concentrated in one branch”.166 Robert Stevens has also appeared to accept this more 
realistic description, referring to it as a “balance of powers”. He notes that in a system 
of responsible government, the different branches interact constantly and that such 
relationships can “exist within the acceptable levels of tolerance of the English concept 
of the balance of powers.”167 While this approach is certainly not accepted by all 
commentators (Nick Barber has, for example, claimed that Barendt’s theory is too 
ambitious, as it equates the doctrine of the separation of powers with a theory of the 
state
168
) it will nonetheless, shape the approach adopted for the remainder of this thesis. 
Whichever approach one takes, it is clear that Walter Bagehot’s rejection of the theory 
has become unfashionable in recent times, and it is further evident that the notion was 
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well in the minds of those drafting our new constitutional arrangements. That may also 
reflect the concerns that Parliament, once dominant, is now frequently seen to be 
subservient to the executive.
169
 Alan Paterson has claimed that it is, in fact, the 
movement towards a purer separation of powers in the United Kingdom which is in part 
responsible for the issues around accountability discussed in earlier Chapters.
170
 
Jonathan Sumption has theorised that one reason for the expansion of the judicial 
control of Government is the declining public reputation of Parliament and a 
diminishing respect for the political process generally.
171
 This is not to say that judges 
would be well advised to “proclaim themselves as consciously filling a political vacuum 
left by an ineffective opposition”.172 It will be interesting to analyse the impact that the 
Coalition Government has had on a system sometimes described as an “elected 
dictatorship”. Currently, many might share Sir Jack Beatson’s view that “while the 
House of Commons in theory controls the government, save exceptionally, it is the 
government which controls the House.”173 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the 
tendency for ministers to exercise their powers “through semi-autonomous executive 
agencies has introduced new elements into the constitutional triangle.”174 
Structural Separation of Powers and the Role of the Lord Chancellor 
The clearest justifications for the introduction of new structural methods for judicial 
accountability come with the loss of the traditional office of Lord Chancellor, following 
the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
175
 Prior to the introduction of the 
2005 Act, the Lord Chancellor had a strange and hybrid role. The complex range of 
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responsibilities had been acquired over an extended period of time and is argued that 
they arose “as much from historical accident as from strategic logic.”176 
The Lord Chancellor acted as a senior judge, a member of the cabinet and he presided 
over the House of Lords. He was also, however, bound by collective responsibility as a 
member of the cabinet and, as a senior judge, sat inter alia on the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords.
177
 Lord Irvine once claimed that the office allowed for a “natural 
conduit for communications between the judiciary and the executive, so that each fully 
understands the legitimate objectives of the other”.178 Theoretically, the Lord 
Chancellor was answerable to Parliament for matters such as the administration of 
justice and judicial appointments, although Andrew Le Sueur has questioned the 
effectiveness of this form of accountability, particularly since the “Lord Chancellor’s 
Department was the last of the major government departments to become shadowed by 
a House of Commons select committee.”179 Gavin Drewry has argued that historically, 
Lord Chancellors had “fiercely resisted any hint of parliamentary intrusion into judicial 
territory” founding this “claim to immunity” on a “very literal interpretation of the 
principles of separation of powers and judicial independence.”180  
It is broadly accepted that, while the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister were 
responsible for judicial appointments under the previous arrangements, any political 
influence in the appointments process had effectively faded away in the modern era.
181
 
Sir Thomas Legg (former Permanent Secretary of the Lord Chancellor’s Department 
and Clerk of the Crown in Chancery) has suggested that one practical reason for this 
was that, in modern times, the number of senior silks, who were likely to become 
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candidates for judicial office, but who were also involved in politics, diminished to near 
vanishing point.
182
 Lord Mackay of Clashfern has said that during his time as Lord 
Chancellor, he was free to exercise his judgment: 
Completely independently of any other person in the light of all the information 
available to me and it was never a consideration whether or not a candidate had made 
decisions or statements for or against the Government. At the Home Affairs 
Committee, I was asked whether the Prime Minister had ever differed from the Lord 
Chancellor’s advice on judicial appointment. In view of the continuing confidential 
relationship, I gave a careful answer, but since that relationship is long since 
concluded I can now say that my advice was invariably taken by Mrs Thatcher and 
Mr Major as they then were.
183
 
As is now well known, the statutory nature and powers of the office of Lord Chancellor 
meant that the office could not simply be abolished via a ministerial reshuffle.
184
 
Ultimately, the office was retained, but gutted of most of its original functions, as the 
Lord Chancellor, amongst other things, ceased to be the head of the judiciary (or even a 
judge) and was replaced as Speaker in the Lords. The creation of the Judicial 
Appointments Commission limited severely his once wide ranging powers in relation to 
judicial appointments. 
At the time of the reforms, the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee 
sounded a warning that: 
There is a radical difference between on the one hand a Lord Chancellor, who as a 
judge is bound by a judicial oath, who has a special constitutional importance 
enjoyed by no other member of the Cabinet and who is usually at the end of his 
career (and thus without temptations associated with positive advancement) and on 
the other hand a minister who is a full-time politician, who is not bound by any 
judicial oath and who may be a middle-ranking or junior member of the Cabinet with 
hopes of future promotion.
185
 
This problem can only have been exacerbated following the creation of the Ministry of 
Justice, which gave the now Justice Secretary responsibility for prisons and other 
matters which had previously been under the purview of the Home Office. This was 
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another significant reform where it appeared that the Government had not given great 
thought to the constitutional implications. Nor had it sought the views of the senior 
judiciary. Jack Straw recalls in his memoirs that the (then) Home Secretary, John Reid, 
had cavalierly floated the splitting of the Home Office in an article in the Sunday 
Telegraph in January 2007, and had done so “to knock off another, disobliging story 
about which they were concerned.” Straw suggests that Lord Falconer only learnt of his 
intentions through a telephone conversation the previous evening. He records that the 
(then) Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips, had commented that the impetus for the 
proposal was anxiety by John Reid to “clear the decks so he could make a concerted 
attack on terrorism. It was not because he thought it a very good idea to have a Ministry 
of Justice.”186 
A formal announcement of the plans came in late March 2007 and the new Ministry was 
created on 9 May 2007. The House of Lords Constitution Committee concluded that the 
Government seemed “to have learnt little or nothing from the debacle surrounding the 
constitutional reforms initiated in 2003” and that expressed the hope that “constitutional 
affairs remain central to the Ministry of Justice’s responsibilities and are not 
downgraded in importance compared to the other duties of the Ministry.”187 
The 2005 Act did not require the office holder to be either a lawyer or a peer. Instead, 
section 2 of the 2005 Act provided that the Lord Chancellor was to be “qualified by 
experience”, which could include experience as a Minister of the Crown, an MP or Peer, 
or “other experience that the Prime Minister considers relevant.” The impact of these 
wide ranging changes, whilst appreciated by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, was 
not immediately obvious. Change was incremental. The first holder of the new office, 
Lord Falconer, was a peer and Queen’s Counsel. Whilst famously described by Lord 
Woolf as either a “cheerful” or a “cheeky chappie”, depending upon which report is to 
be believed
188
 he was a heavyweight politician who was, on occasion, willing to stand 
up for the judiciary when they were criticised by his political colleagues.
189
 At that time, 
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however, the Department for Constitutional Affairs resembled far more closely its 
predecessor than the modern Ministry of Justice. 
While Lord Falconer oversaw the creation of the Ministry of Justice; which is now 
responsible for the courts and judiciary, civil and criminal law, criminal justice policy 
including sentencing and prisons, the probation service and some aspects of 
constitutional reform), he was replaced (fairly swiftly) by Jack Straw after Gordon 
Brown succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister. Straw describes the immediate 
budgetary pressures faced by the new department in his memoirs
190
 and these new 
responsibilities and pressures must have changed the character of the Department. But, 
it was still helmed by a senior politician, who had qualified as a lawyer and who had 
held many of the great offices of state.
191
 
Upon the formation of the current coalition Government (and thereafter) there was some 
speculation that the Conservatives might seek to revert to a more traditional model of 
Lord Chancellor. Immediately following the reforms, Lord Strathclyde, then the 
Conservative leader in the House of Lords, had announced that it was Conservative 
policy under then leader, Michael Howard, to bring back the traditional role.
192
 
Ironically, by 2010, it was Michael Howard himself (who was, of course, a Queen’s 
Counsel and who had, by then, been elevated to the peerage) who was tipped for the 
post.
193
 In the event, another ‘big beast’, Kenneth Clarke, was appointed. Mr Clarke had 
been a Queen’s Counsel, but, like Straw, was not a peer. It is likely that, amongst other 
things, it was thought that a department with such significant responsibilities as the 
Ministry of Justice should have its Secretary of State in the House of Commons 
(although such concerns had not stopped Gordon Brown from appointing Lord 
Mandelson as Secretary of State for Business). 
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In September 2012, the final link to the past was broken when David Cameron 
appointed Chris Grayling as the new Secretary of State for Justice (it is perhaps notable 
that in the original press notice, the title of Lord Chancellor was omitted). He is the first 
non-lawyer to have held the post since the Seventeenth Century. Following Mr 
Grayling’s appointment, there has been some further consideration of the maintenance 
of the office of Lord Chancellor, much of it stemming from a seminar held at Queen 
Mary, University of London in June 2013, as part of an AHRC funded project on The 
Politics of Judicial Independence in Britain’s Changing Constitution. The event was 
held on a Chatham House basis, but involved senior former politicians and judges. It 
was suggested by one speaker that the retention of the title may have become something 
of a constitutional problem and that it might be better to stop pretending that the Lord 
Chancellor still exists so that we have a proper separation of powers. (It is probably 
worth referencing that around this time, contentious reforms of legal aid powers, briefly 
referenced in Chapter Three, had led to extreme criticism of Mr Grayling by many 
lawyers).
194
 
John Crook subsequently argued that “to all intents and purposes the office of Lord 
Chancellor was abolished in the reforms” and that the real change was that the office 
could be held by an “ambitious mid-career politician.”195 Patrick O’Brien has said that 
while the judiciary and lawyers have always seen the constitutional changes as being 
about them, this is not the Government’s primary interest. He notes that there may have 
been a somewhat ‘rose-tinted’ view of the role of the Lord Chancellor in representing 
the interests of the judiciary, since many Lord Chancellors of recent decades had fallen 
out with the judiciary. Most importantly, he concluded that “if the Lord Chancellor does 
not really exist anymore, should we not face this fact and get rid of the title and legacy 
functions associated with it.”196 
As well as reforming the office of Lord Chancellor, the 2005 Act also removed the Law 
Lords from the House of Lords and (combined with the House of Commons 
(Disqualification) Act 1975, which prohibits full time judges from standing for election 
to the House of Commons) from the legislature. 
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The apparent need to observe, more formally, the strictures of the separation of powers 
has led to a greater distance between the Government and the judiciary. Lord Falconer, 
the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs who led the 
reforms, had said that the “overall aim of these reforms is to put the relationship 
between the executive, legislature and judiciary on a modern footing, respecting the 
separation of powers between the three”.197 While ‘modernisation’ and dealing with 
potential constitutional issues (discussed below) may have been the main catalyst for 
reform, this does not appear to be the whole story. In his biography of Tony Blair, 
Anthony Seldon states that discussions about the reforms had taken place between Lord 
Irvine and the then Prime Minister. He indicated that: 
Irvine favoured a ‘rights’ department, as did most of the legal profession. Blair, 
however, was much closer to Blunkett (and Straw before him) favouring a less 
liberal and more authoritarian solution with a clearer separation of the role of judges 
and politicians.
198
 
Interestingly, Alastair Campbell records in his diaries that “previously [Tony Blair] had 
argued he needed to shake things up and put an elected MP in charge of the new 
department.”199 
It is suggested that although a “fundamental change” to the position of Lord Chancellor 
“had been in the air since 1997” (as it was not considered sustainable to have the Lord 
Chancellor heading both the judiciary and acting effectively as Speaker in the Lords, as 
well as wearing his numerous other hats), the initial plan to give “direct administrative 
control of the courts to the Home Office” had been scuppered by Lord Irvine, who was 
said to have argued forcibly “that to separate the courts from the judges would 
undermine judicial independence.”200 Furthermore, it is thought that the Prime Minister 
had initially wanted Lord Irvine to oversee the changes, but that Irvine was “an ardent 
believer in the Holy Trinity.” It is also important not to overlook the personal dimension 
and the relationship between the men. Lord Irvine had been a “long standing mentor” to 
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Tony Blair, the head of his chambers when he joined the Bar and the man who had 
introduced him to his wife.
201
  
Seldon recalls that at the time he finally decided to remove Irvine and instigate the 
changes, Tony Blair had not only failed to consult the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Woolf, about the move, but that he had not consulted with the Leader of the House of 
Lords or even the Queen about the proposed abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor.
202
 
In any event, whatever the precise political motivation for the reform, any moves 
towards introducing new forms of political accountability, to replace those lost through 
the reforms, were strongly resisted. In particular, the Government forcefully rejected the 
idea of judicial confirmation hearings, arguing that: 
MPs and lay peers would not necessarily be competent to assess the appointees’ 
legal or judicial skills [and] if the intention was to assess their more general 
approach to issues of public importance, this would be inconsistent with the 
move to take the Supreme Court out of the potential political arena.
203
  
This need for structural separation was not accepted by many, with Lord Lloyd, a retired 
Law Lord, articulating the main objections in evidence to the House of Commons 
Constitutional Affairs Committee. Notably, he observed that: 
[W]e do not in this country have what is often referred to as a separation of powers. 
We know that there is a separation of powers under the American constitution and, 
indeed, the French constitution, and that it derives from the French philosophers of 
the 18th century. But in England we have never had a separation of powers. We have 
instead the rule of law. The rule of law is one whereby everybody is under the law, 
including the executive.
204
 
In fact, the anxieties about the previous constitutional arrangements that emerged in 
2003 were as much practical as theoretical. Concerns had arisen about the role of the 
Lord Chancellor following the case of McGonnell v United Kingdom
205
 in which 
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objections had been raised to the Bailiff of Guernsey acting as both principal judge and 
speaker of the island’s legislature.206 This may have been aggravated by the fact that 
then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, had continued to sit as a judge in the House of Lords 
until 2001, in spite of criticism.
207
 Furthermore, the Law Lords were finding their place 
within the legislature had become increasingly uncomfortable and their activities 
constrained. These issues had crystallised to some extent by the time that the 
Government had decided to undertake its constitutional reforms. The Department for 
Constitutional Affairs was, in effect, acknowledging that the Human Rights Act and 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights “now requires a stricter view to 
be taken not only of anything which might undermine the independence or impartiality 
of a judicial tribunal, but even of anything which might appear to do so.”208  
Even if one accepts Lord Lloyd’s arguments, it becomes clear that there were structural 
issues to be addressed. Lord Lloyd himself recognized that “since it may be the judges 
who have to decide whether ministers are breaking the law or exceeding their powers or 
whatever it may be, it is obviously vital that the judiciary and the executive should be 
separate and distinct”, he simply did not accept that this meant that the judges and 
legislature “should be distinct and separate.” 209  
However, in seeking to ensure structural separation of powers and avoid the potential 
politicisation of the judiciary, what was overlooked by the architects of the reforms at 
that time, was the fact that many other countries which clearly had due respect for the 
rule of law (and separation of powers) nonetheless allowed for political involvement in 
the selection of judges for their top courts.  
An additional point is that Parliament could have acted as a check and balance on both 
executive
210
 and judiciary in the appointments process.
211
 In the United States, it is 
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suggested that their “dual-branch” appointment process, shaped by Madison’s checks 
and balances, was designed “to preserve judges’ independence from incursion by either 
branch acting alone.”212 In the UK, some issues have arisen following interventions by 
the judiciary. Examples include the controversy over Jack Straw’s ‘non-appointment’ of 
Jonathan Sumption QC (following an alleged intervention by senior judges)
213
 and the 
apparent shambles over the replacement of Sir Mark Potter as Head of the Family 
Division.
214
 Both of these incidents demonstrated not only a lack of transparency in the 
process, but also the potential for the judiciary to interfere in a decisive fashion. 
This need for checks and balances has become increasingly important in relation to 
Supreme Court appointments, where critics of the process have suggested that what is, 
in effect, happening in the UK is that judges are appointing judges (and that there are 
very real dangers if judges are perceived as a self-appointing oligarchy).
215
 As Robert 
Stevens has declared: “Judges choosing judges is the antithesis of democracy.”216 
Given that the executive retains a role in the appointment process (which many would 
see as a necessary check on the judicial branch dominating the appointments process), it 
is difficult to object to a similar role for Parliament based solely on the on the theory of 
the separation of powers. It is also worth noting that the Constitutional Reform Act did 
not remove Parliament’s role in removing senior judges. Witnesses to the House of 
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Lords Constitution Committee inquiry into judicial appointments noted that one of the 
justification for pre or post-appointment hearings was that “the judges should meet the 
body vested with the constitutional power to dismiss them.”217 
A number of observers expressed doubts about the process of appointing Supreme Court 
Justices, particularly the fact that the President and Deputy President of the court made 
up two of the five person panel, and have suggested expanding the panel and the 
number of lay members on it.
218
 In an interview with the author, a former Permanent 
Secretary at the Lord Chancellor’s Department confirmed that historically, prior to the 
reforms of 2005, the Lord Chancellor would normally pay great attention to the views 
of the most senior judges – the Law Lords for appointments to the House of Lords and 
the Heads of Division and the Lord Chief Justice for the Court of Appeal.
219
 Given the 
continued opacity of the current process, it is not clear what impact the view of the 
judges has within the appointments process. These concerns have been recognised by 
both the senior judiciary (particularly with reference to the fact that the President and 
Deputy President of the Supreme Court were required to sit on, and, in the case of the 
President, to chair, the selection commissions which appoint their successors)
220
 and the 
Government, which implemented further reforms to the system through the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013 (which are discussed in Chapter Five).  
Institutional Independence and the Need for Judicial Accountability 
On a functional level, the arguments around the separation of powers theory above, 
cannot, in and of themselves, be used to counter greater political involvement in the 
appointment process for the most senior judges. Countries, such as the United States, 
which have far greater regard for the theory, nonetheless accept that introducing a 
political aspect into the appointments process does not impact on the subsequent 
independence of the judiciary. 
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Indeed, it could be argued that the very reforms themselves added further impetus for 
new methods of judicial accountability. The fact that the Lord Chancellor is no longer 
required to be a senior lawyer means that his ability to act as a “safety valve avoiding 
under tension between the judiciary and the government” has undoubtedly been 
compromised and curtailed.
221
 This, combined with an increasing distance between 
judiciary and the other branches of government, may be one reason for the increased 
tensions.
222
 An example is the spat between the former Labour Home Secretary, Charles 
Clarke, and the judiciary after the former sought to have discussions with the senior 
Law Lord, Lord Bingham, about how to make counter-terrorism laws compatible with 
the European Convention on Human Rights.
223
 Lord Bingham refused a meeting and, 
following the incident, Charles Clarke said that “the judiciary bears not the slightest 
responsibility for protecting the public and sometimes seem utterly unaware of the 
implications of their decisions for our security.” He suggested that it was time “for the 
senior judiciary to engage in serious and considered debate as to how best to legally 
confront terrorism in modern circumstances”.224 
The judiciary was very critical of this approach. Lord Phillips commented that such a 
proposal “would have been inappropriate and infringed the principle of the separation of 
powers”225, whilst Lord Steyn observed rather sharply that “Mr Clarke apparently fails 
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to understand that the Law Lords and Cabinet ministers are not on the same side.”226 
The judges were plainly concerned about the impact of advising the Government, 
clearly not wishing to return to the Seventeenth Century practice of giving advice to the 
Crown where the law appeared to be doubtful and rendering extra-judicial opinions.
227
  
Yet this critique is perhaps not as clear-cut as that presented by the judges. After all, 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, a Law Lord, had conducted a review of the counter-terrorism 
legislation in 1996, whilst Lord Phillips acknowledged that he frequently met with the 
Lord Chancellor and regularly with the Home Secretary to discuss “matters of common 
interest.”228 Hence the judges’ reluctance to meet and discuss issues with the executive 
might be seen as somewhat selective.
229
 The question of judicial dialogue with the 
executive was addressed in the Latimer House Principles on the Three Branches of 
Government, agreed by representatives from over 20 Commonwealth countries in 1998 
which provides:  
While dialogue between the judiciary and government may be desirable or 
appropriate, in no circumstances should such dialogue compromise judicial 
independence. 
Judges can have a dialogue with Parliament, both in public (by way of appearances 
before Select Committees) and privately (by, for example, meeting Select Committee 
Chairs).
230
 They can also be involved in law reform, through the Law Commission. 
Under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act, the Lord Chief Justice
231
 is able to 
“lay before Parliament written representations on matters that appear to him to be 
matters of importance relating to the judiciary, or otherwise to the administration of 
justice” – the so called “nuclear option”.232 
Judges are also doing an unprecedented amount of public speaking, and speeches and 
lectures are now being broadcast and retained for posterity on various official websites. 
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The content of these speeches has also changed. As has been observed elsewhere
233
, we 
have come a long way since 1955 when Lord Kilmuir denied a request from the BBC 
for judicial co-operation with a series of radio broadcasts about great judges of the past 
by stating:  
The overriding consideration, in the opinion of myself and my colleagues, is the 
importance of keeping the judiciary in this country insulated from the controversies 
of the day. So long as a judge keeps silent his reputation for wisdom and impartiality 
remains unassailable: but every utterance he makes in public, except in the course of 
... his judicial duties, must necessarily bring him within the focus of criticism. 
Since the revocation of the Kilmuir rules
234
 in 1987, by then Lord Chancellor Lord 
Mackay, initially it may have been more usual for judges to have been advised to speak 
on “technical legal matters, which are unlikely to be controversial.”235 More recently, 
judges have chosen to speak out on contentious matters in a fashion that might perhaps 
be described as ‘injudicious’.236  
The most recent guide to judicial conduct (drafted not by the Ministry of Justice, but by 
a working group of judges set up by the Judges’ Council, under the chairmanship of 
Lord Justice Pill, and published by the Judges’ Council in August 2011) contains a 
whole host of caveats, but notes that there is no objection to contributions to, or 
participation in, lectures and seminars “provided the issue directly affects the operation 
of the courts, the independence of the judiciary or aspects of the administration of 
justice.”237 The (then) Lord Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, appeared someone uneasy 
about this development suggesting that, in principle, the Government and the judiciary 
“get on better” where the judges avoided making political speeches or commenting on 
decisions in Parliament and that there was a risk that “these conventions get weaker if 
you are not careful”.238 The (then) Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger, also expressed 
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some concerns stating that judges should be cautious “not only in the choice of subject, 
but also in the manner in which their contributions to public debate are phrased”. He 
suggested that if they chose “to be brave, to quote Sir Humphrey [...], they should not be 
surprised to find themselves facing a robust response from the executive or the 
legislature” and that it would be hard for them “to retreat behind the shield of judicial 
independence and complain about the nature or tone of any responses.” He added: 
A judge can scarcely complain about Ministers criticising him for the way he is 
doing his job if he criticises Ministers for the way they are doing their jobs. And if 
they slang each other off in public, members of the judiciary and members of the 
other two branches of government will undermine each other, and, inevitably, the 
constitution of which they are all a fundamental part, and on which democracy, the 
rule of law, and our whole society rests.
239
 
In 2000, Keith Ewing, having regard to the increased propensity for judges to publish in 
law journals, posed the question: 
If judges are prepared to publicize their views in this way, why not directly before a 
body representing people in a public forum, such as a Select Committee of the House 
of Commons?
240
 
Whilst judges have increasingly been willing to give their lectures in public fora, at 
universities or before NGOs, they do not seem to be content to be questioned on those 
views or engage in dialogue with parliamentarians. 
Finally, senior judges have been willing to sit on public inquiries and commissions that 
consider policy issues.
241
 While it is probably not conceivable that a judge who had 
been involved in such activities would subsequently hear a relevant case, it does 
demonstrate that judges are willing to be involved in activities that go well beyond their 
precise judicial role. Sir Jack Beatson has recognised the dangers in this, contending 
that: 
The experiences of Lord Scott and Lord Hutton who chaired inquiries in 1996 and 
2003 into the sale of arms to Iraq and the death of Dr David Kelly, show the risks 
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when judges chair [politically charged inquiries]. The appointment of a judge does 
not depoliticise an inherently political issue.
242
 
The recent experience of Lord Leveson in chairing the inquiry into media standards 
would seem to support this view.
243
 One might conclude from all of this that the senior 
judiciary have been willing to enter treacherous terrain as long as they retained a degree 
of control over their outputs and interlocutors. 
It is in their day job that the judges face the greatest dangers. As Bogdanor has noted, 
“the more judges are asked to provide the answers to complex moral and political 
questions, which are the subject of debate in society, the greater will be the pressure to 
make them politically accountable”.244 Lord Justice Etherton has also recognised the 
risks, noting that while the senior judiciary might be making policies quite legitimately, 
or exercising policy-making powers conferred upon them by Parliament, this meant that 
“there has to be a much more intense focus on the appointments process for those higher 
courts in order to provide constitutional legitimacy for them in a democratic society”.245  
The need for checks and balances does not only apply to an overreaching executive, a 
point recognised by both Lord Scarman and Lord Diplock in Dupont Steel.
246
 If the 
judges are perceived to be acting as lawmakers, it becomes increasingly clear that it is 
worth reassessing the existing model. 
The real issue to be addressed is to ensure that any new methods of accountability do 
not undermine the independence of the judiciary. Section 3(1) of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 provides that the Lord Chancellor and Ministers of the Crown “must 
uphold the continued independence of the judiciary.” As has been noted elsewhere, the 
section does not impose a duty on the judges to be independent, or seek to define 
judicial independence (although it is “taken for granted” that they will be independent 
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as a matter of common law and by virtue of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights).
247
 The Act also clearly spells out that the Lord Chancellor and other 
Ministers of the Crown “must not seek to influence particular judicial decisions through 
any special access to the judiciary.”248 
Historically, Dicey had observed that: 
Our judges are independent, in the sense of holding their office by permanent tenure, 
and of being raised above the direct influence of the Crown or the Ministry; but the 
judicial department does not pretend to stand on level with Parliament; its functions 
might be modified at any time by an Act of Parliament; and such a statute would be 
no violation of the law.
249
 
While the preceding Chapters demonstrate the increased importance of the judicial 
branch, the changes of 2005; the creation of the Ministry of Justice and the 
Government’s more recent reforms (discussed in Chapter 5) highlight the continuing 
relevance of Dicey’s second proposition. 
Shimon Shetreet has observed that the term independence of the judiciary “carries two 
meanings: the independence of individual judges in the exercise of their judicial 
functions, and the independence of the judiciary as a body”.250 As to the first, Lord 
Justice Brooke has argued that judicial independence may be defined as “the ability of a 
judicial officer to conduct […] work free from improper pressure by executive 
government, by litigants and by particular pressure groups.”251 Concerns about 
Governmental pressure seem particularly strong – the judiciary’s own website stated 
that: 
The responsibilities of judges in disputes between the citizen and the state have 
increased together with the growth in governmental functions over the last century. 
The responsibility of the judiciary to protect citizens against unlawful acts of 
government has thus increased, and with it the need for the judiciary to be 
independent of government.
252
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There is a long list of statutory and other conventions which have been established over 
many centuries to try to ensure the independence of the judiciary. These include the 
provision of the Act of Settlement (now the Senior Courts Act 1981 as amended by the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005) providing that the senior judges
253
 hold office 
quamdiu se bene gesserint
254
; can only be removed on an address of both Houses of 
Parliament; and that judicial salaries should be immune from governmental interference. 
Judges are also given immunity from prosecution for any acts that they carry out in 
performance of their judicial function and benefit from immunity from being sued for 
defamation for the things they say about parties or witnesses in the course of hearing 
cases. 
The procedure to remove a judge has only ever been used on one occasion, when Sir 
Jonah Barrington was removed from the Irish High Court in 1830, having been found 
guilty of embezzlement.
255
 Although it is worth highlighting Gordon Borrie’s 
observation that modern writers seem to have ignored the fact that “there have been 
many attempts at removal and consequently many debates in Parliament concerning the 
conduct of particular judges, mostly in the nineteenth century.”256  
It is also said that “judges have been ‘eased out’ from time to time.” Robert Stevens 
says, for example, that Lord Hailsham (Lord Chancellor under Edward Heath and 
Margaret Thatcher) “had to urge Lord Chief Justice Widgery and Lord Denning on their 
way.”257 
As Masterman has documented, the abovementioned provisions have been reinforced 
by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, the Supreme Court Act 1981 and the 
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Constitutional Reform Act 2005
258
, although again it is worth noting that the former 
President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, has expressed concerns over funding 
arrangements for the Supreme Court and the residual levels of control that this allows 
the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice.
259
 In a speech in 2011 (given whilst he 
was still in office), Lord Phillips went as far as saying that the funding arrangements for 
the courts meant that the court was dependant each year upon what it could persuade the 
Ministry of Justice of England and Wales to give it by way of “contribution”. He argued 
that this was “not a satisfactory situation for the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 
It is already leading to a tendency on the part of the Ministry of Justice to try to gain the 
Supreme Court as an outlying part of its empire.”260 Following his retirement, Lord 
Phillips sought to introduce amendments into the Crime and Courts Bill to ensure that 
the Chief Executive of the Supreme Court was answerable to the President of the Court, 
and not the Ministry of Justice.
261
 Lord Pannick, who tabled the amendment with Lord 
Phillips, said: 
There is […] an important point of principle: of course, the Supreme Court acts 
independently of the Executive, but it must also be seen to do so. Indeed, that was the 
major reason why the Supreme Court was created by the 2005 Act and why the Law 
Lords left this place. For the President of the Supreme Court to have the 
responsibility for appointing the chief executive would emphasise to all concerned 
that this is an independent institution.
262
 
Making clear that he was speaking on behalf of Lord Phillips, Lord Pannick noted that 
“the existing appointment provision led more than once to confusion in parts of the 
Government machine that the chief executive should in some sense be acting at the 
behest of Ministers.” A second issue raised by the amendment was to ensure that the 
chief executive had a “direct accountability to Parliament for the proper use of the 
court’s resources and that she acts independently from ministerial discretion.”263 
Changes reflecting these amendments were enacted in section 29 of the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013, which leaves the President of the UK Supreme Court solely 
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responsible for appointing the chief executive; and the chief executive responsible for 
determining the number of staff and officers of the court.
264
 As an aside, it might be 
wondered why Parliament is a suitable venue to hold the chief executive of the court to 
account, but not the judges.
265
 
Most recently, a conflict has arisen between the judiciary and the current Lord 
Chancellor, Chris Grayling, over plans to potentially privatise, or make self-funding, 
parts of the Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS).266 The Guardian 
newspaper published leaked correspondence sent by the (now former) Lord Chief 
Justice, Lord Judge, to the Lord Chancellor. The letter contained a note on reform of 
HMCTS (written by Lord Justice Gross) which stated, inter alia, that “certain matters 
are or should be axiomatic: no governance or funding arrangements could be 
countenanced which threatened the independence of the judiciary (from the two other 
branches of the state) the rule of law or access to justice.” 
On governance, the note said that the judiciary saw “the need for an HMCTS […] 
independent of direct ministerial control” and argued that it was “essential that the 
Judiciary is involved in the governance” of any new Courts and Tribunal Service (CTS) 
“at all levels.” The note also stated that in relation to “internal arrangements concerning 
the leadership and management of the judiciary” this must “remain with the judiciary” 
whilst the Judicial Office “would continue to have a major and perhaps enhanced 
role.”267 
While this is all a long way from suggesting that any new CTS should be run directly by 
the judiciary, the abovementioned moves in respect of the Supreme Court, combined 
with concerns about funding for the current HMCTS makes such an option seem at least 
feasible in the longer term. 
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Whereas once it might have been an accepted view to argue that the function of the 
judge was to decide cases and it was only necessary for the judge to have some control 
over what has been described as “the administrative penumbra immediately surrounding 
the judicial process, such as listing” the judiciary has more recently argued that “the rule 
of law has to be founded on the institutional independence of the judiciary”, namely 
“the ability of the judiciary as an institution and a separate branch of government to be 
free of executive interference in a wider context”.268 
A practical example of this separation can be seen in the governance arrangements that 
have been established since the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act. Sir Jack 
Beatson had earlier highlighted this in a speech on judicial accountability and 
independence, in which he commented that the judiciary has had to “take an 
institutional position on the matters which it is responsible”, developing governance 
mechanisms through the Judicial Executive Board and a “revived and reinvigorated 
Judges’ Council.”269 Judicial training has also been left in the hands of the judiciary 
through the Judicial Studies Board, which has also developed new strands of training, 
such as “leadership and management.”270 Lord Justice Thomas has gone further in 
spelling out these reforms, indicating that “if the judiciary are to govern their branch of 
the state, they must have their own structure of governance to ensure the proper 
governance of the system.” He noted that the transfer of the headship of the judiciary (of 
England and Wales) to the Lord Chief Justice enables the judiciary to alter its 
governance structures “internally without recourse to Parliament”, with the relevant 
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checks and balances being those “already inbeing within the judiciary, namely what was 
known as ‘the extended family’ and the Judges Council.”271 
Whilst it seems likely that the judiciary might resent any additional political influence 
on appointments
272
 and contend that it threatens judicial independence, this approach 
might well risk the counter-argument that the judiciary was seeking to maintain its own 
interests. In that context, it may be worth considering the influence of the 
abovementioned bodies and the judicial hierarchy and its impact on the independence of 
individual judges.
273
 It has also been suggested that the judiciary is not above simply 
resisting change that it dislikes by citing concerns around judicial independence.
274
 It is 
worth remembering that when Lord Mackay proposed ending barristers’ monopoly in 
respect of advocacy in the higher courts, the cry went up that this was “a gross threat to 
judicial independence and the rule of law.”275 Certainly, the senior judiciary has never 
explained how enhancing political accountability in the appointments process would 
“almost inevitably transform accountability into unacceptable influence and thereby 
undermine judicial independence.”276 
As regards the question of appointment hearings, or other political involvement in 
appointments, the issue is less the structural or institutional independence, but as 
Malleson has suggested, the need to ensure that the ability of a judge to impartially 
determine the cases that come before them is not impaired.
277
 Whilst Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR might require the courts to be impartial and avoid the appearance of bias, it is 
difficult to see how this, in itself, would preclude a political aspect to the appointments 
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process particularly given the way that the judges of the Strasbourg court are themselves 
appointed.
278
 As mentioned above, the current domestic system still retains a role for the 
executive, and this has been recognised by the judiciary. For example, in 2007 Lord 
Phillips observed that: 
Although in general I can see no role for the executive in selecting judges, there is a 
case for a limited power of veto in relation to the most senior appointments. The 
senior judiciary today have, to some extent, to work in partnership with government. 
It would, I think, be unfortunate is a Chief Justice were appointed in whose integrity 
and abilities the Government had not confidence.
279
 
More recently, giving evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, he said 
that while the process should not be political and should be focused on selecting the best 
candidate for the job: 
[O]ne has to recognise that at the highest level it is pretty disastrous if you have in 
position a judge who simply has not got the confidence of the government – who, for 
one reason or another, is anathema to them. I think it is highly desirable there should 
be a mechanism that will, all things being equal, prevent that happening.
280
 
It remains important that a perception does not develop that the judiciary governs itself 
in its own interest (rather than in the interests of the country as a whole).
281
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Chapter 5: The Government Responds 
How judges are selected is a matter of constitutional significance. Selection is not just 
about sterile processes. It is about balancing independence, accountability and 
legitimacy, and ensuring that the process for selection is not captured by any vested 
interest. (Baroness Prashar)
282
 
Despite the fact that the Constitutional Reform Act was only passed in 2005 (and that it 
was subject to extensive consultation and a Concordat between the executive and the 
judiciary) it would be wrong to think that either the Labour or subsequent Coalition 
Government found that it had settled matters, or put the judiciary on a modern 
footing.
283
 Indeed, there were many further legislative changes. 
It might be argued that the later reforms were not particularly predicated on theoretical 
concerns around the separation of powers or judicial independence (insofar as those 
reforms that were actually enacted focused far more on encouraging diversity). 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that shortly after the passage of the 2005 Act, there were 
additional changes to eligibility for judicial appointments, made under the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007), which altered (and loosened) the criteria for 
appointment to a number of judicial offices. 
Furthermore, the executive’s involvement in judicial appointments was the subject of 
some discussion during the final years of the Labour Government. In October 2007, the 
Government produced a consultation document entitled The Governance of Britain – 
Judicial Appointments. The consultation posed a number of questions seeking views on 
the existing functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary in relation to 
appointments and considered the scope of transferring functions. In March 2008, the 
Government published a White Paper and a Draft Bill setting out proposals for further 
changes to the system of judicial appointments. In particular, the Labour Government 
stated that it believed “that the role of the executive in the appointment of judges should 
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be reduced, that the existing arrangements for these appointments should be streamlined 
and that those who exercise power should be made more accountable.”284 It was 
suggested that the Lord Chancellor should be removed from the selection process of 
judicial appointments below the High Court level and that the Prime Minister should be 
removed from the appointments process completely. In addition, it was proposed that 
the Lord Chief Justice should no longer be required to consult the Lord Chancellor, or to 
obtain his concurrence, before deploying, authorising, nominating, or extending the 
service of judicial office holders (unless there were “financial implications”). 
During the course of the various Governance of Britain consultations, the Government 
again noted the opposition to the idea of any role for the legislature “in the selection or 
making of judicial appointments, and in particular to confirmation hearings for 
individual appointments to judicial posts.”285 Nonetheless, it accepted that “there could 
be merit in a meeting of the House of Commons Justice Affairs Committee and the 
House of Lords Constitution Committee to hold the system to account on an annual 
basis.”286 
These suggestions failed to make it into the Constitutional Reform and Governance 
Act 2010, but ideas for tinkering with the system did not end there. In November 2011, 
the Ministry of Justice issued a further consultation paper, entitled Appointments and 
Diversity: A Judiciary for the 21st Century.
287
 The paper acknowledged a need to 
address “the degree of transparency surrounding some appointments.” The consultation 
recognised the fact that the Lord Chancellor was required to make the vast majority of 
judicial appointments.
288
 But, it set out a number of alternative frameworks, including 
transferring the Lord Chancellor’s decision-making role and his power to appoint to the 
Lord Chief Justice (in relation to appointments below the Court of Appeal or High 
Court). The consultation also questioned: whether the Lord Chancellor be consulted 
prior to the start of the selection process for the most senior judicial roles; whether the 
Lord Chancellor should participate on the selection panel for the appointment of the 
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Lord Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court (and in so doing, lose the right to 
a veto). The thorny question of whether judges should be involved in appointing their 
successors was also addressed.  
The resistance to change and the introduction of new forms of political accountability 
(particularly from the judiciary) can be seen from the most recent report on these issues 
by the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Judicial Appointments, which was 
published in March 2012. The Committee acknowledged that there were a number of 
arguments in favour of greater accountability
289
 (discussed in more detail below). In 
spite of this, the Committee stated that it was against any proposals to introduced pre-
appointment hearings for judges since “such hearings could not have any meaningful 
impact without undermining the independence of those subsequently appointed”; and, in 
any event, “judges’ legitimacy depends on their independent status and appointment on 
merit, not on any democratic mandate.”290 It also determined that, unless a judge served 
a leadership role, such as the Lord Chief Justice or the President of the Supreme Court, 
“post-appointment hearings of senior judges would serve no useful purpose.”291 Finally 
(and again ignoring the role of the democratic mandate), the Committee claimed that 
while there might be a need for greater ‘lay’ involvement in the process of 
appointments, “parliamentarians, acting in that capacity, should not sit on selection 
panels for judicial appointments” as “there is no useful role that parliamentarians could 
play that could not be played by lay members on selection panels.”292 This conservatism 
on the part of the Committee was underpinned by the views expressed by the vast 
majority of the judges that gave evidence to it. 
The Government did end up pursuing further changes to the judicial appointments 
system and the criteria for appointment through the Crime and Courts Act 2013 – which 
again focused almost entirely on diversity. The approach to judicial appointments taken 
during the passage of that Bill varied and may have been impacted on by the change of 
Lord Chancellor mid-way through the process.
293
 Schedule 13 of the 2013 Act made a 
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number of amendments to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. These included an 
amendment to allow for there to be fewer than 12 full time equivalent Supreme Court 
judges at any time – the new provision means that rather than simply specifying the 
Court consists of 12 judges, the Court could instead consist of those persons appointed 
as its judges – provided that the be no more than the full time equivalent of 12 at any 
time. This would theoretically permit part-time Supreme Court judges. One of the more 
notable of the changes that was enacted was the introduction of the “tipping point” 
principle, which (following a late amendment) could be applied to appointments to the 
Supreme Court where two candidates were of equal merit. This would allow a selection 
commission to take diversity into consideration when making the final selection 
decision between two candidates of equal merit. However, the provision is designed so 
that it would only come into play when two candidates for a Supreme Court 
appointment have satisfied the merit criteria. The relevant (and somewhat complex) part 
provides: 
Diversity considerations where candidates for judicial office are of equal merit. 
In section 27 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (selection for appointment to 
Supreme Court to be on merit etc) after subsection (5) insert –  
“(5A) Where two persons are of equal merit –  
(a) section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 (positive action: recruitment etc) does not 
apply in relation to choosing between them, but 
(b) Part 5 of that Act (public appointments etc) does not prevent the commission 
from preferring one of them over the other for the purpose of increasing diversity 
within the group of persons who are the judges of the Court.” 
10 (1) Section 63 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (judicial appointments to be 
solely on merit) is amended as follows.  
(2) In subsection (1) (selections to which subsections (2) and (3) apply) for “and  
(3)” substitute “to (4)”. 
(3) After subsection (3) insert –  
“(4) Neither “solely” in subsection (2), nor Part 5 of the Equality Act 2010 (public 
appointments etc), prevents the selecting body, where two persons are of equal merit, 
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from preferring one of them over the other for the purpose of increasing diversity 
within— 
(a) the group of persons who hold offices for which there is selection under this Part, 
or  
(b) a sub-group of that group. 
Helpfully, the Explanatory Notes to the Act indicate that Part 2 of Schedule 13 “amends 
section 27 of the Constitutional Reform Act to provide that the UK Supreme Court is 
not prevented from preferring one candidate over another for the purposes of increasing 
diversity where two candidates are of equal merit.” 
In addition, new criteria were introduced in relation to the composition of selection 
commissions for the UK Supreme Court appointments. Following on from the 
recommendations of the House of Lords Constitution Committee, no politicians were 
included on the panel. Instead, the selection committee would have to include: a 
minimum of 5 members (and in any case an odd number of members); at least one 
serving judge of the Supreme Court; at least one non-legally qualified member; and at 
least one member from the Judicial Appointment Commission, the Judicial 
Appointment Commission of Scotland and the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointment 
Commission. 
New provisions were also included in relation to the composition of selection 
commissions for the appointment of the President and Deputy President of the Supreme 
Court (again following a recommendation of the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee). These changes ensure that when such appointments are made, the 
President or Deputy President are precluded from sitting on the selection panel 
convened to select their replacement. 
The Act also made changes to the selection process for the Lord Chief Justice and 
Heads of Division (the details of which were moved to secondary legislation). The role 
of the Lord Chancellor in the appointments process was also diminished, as the power 
to decide upon selections made by the Judicial Appointment Commission was 
transferred to the Lord Chief Justice, or Senior President of Tribunals respectively, for 
certain judicial offices below High Court. 
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Finally, following the enactment of the 2013 Act, three statutory instruments were 
published: The Draft Judicial Appointment Regulations 2013; the Draft Judicial 
Appointments Commission Regulations 2013; and, the Draft Supreme Court (Judicial 
Appointment) Regulations 2013. These Regulations were developed in conjunction with 
the judiciary and the Judicial Appointments Commission (and the JAC Regulations and 
Supreme Court Regulations were agreed with the Lord Chief Justice and Presdient of 
the Supreme Court respectively). 
Helen Grant, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice 
tasked with piloting the regulations through the Delegated Legislation Committee, 
summarised the effect of them. Noteworthy changes included: a revision of selection 
panels for senior judicial offices, comprising the Lord Chief Justice, Heads of Division, 
the Senior President of Tribunals and ordinary judges of the Court of Appeal. Helen 
Grant said that the panels would be increased in size, made more diverse and that lay 
representation on them would also increase. In addition, the Lord Chancellor would be 
provided with a consultative role, reflecting the existing role in relation to Supreme 
Court appointments, on the selection of Lord Justices of Appeal and the Senior 
President of Tribunals. The Minister argued that: “Given the importance of those 
judicial offices to the administration of justice and the leadership that they provide to 
the judiciary, there is a clear case for the Executive to be able to express their view for 
reasons of accountability to the public and Parliament”.294 
The House of Lords Constitution Committee welcomed the fact that many of the 
eventual changes had stemmed from the recommendations in its report Judicial 
Appointments, noting that it had also succeeded in helping to “improve the bill” by 
recommending that the Lord Chancellor should not be included on selection panels and 
in securing a “diversity duty” for the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice – 
amendments which were “widely supported on all sides of the House during the Bill’s 
passage.”295 
It is plain that the bulk of these provisions were designed to increase the diversity of the 
court and hence its legitimacy; but the decision leaves a number of other underlying 
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questions unanswered. Even amongst the Supreme Court Justices, there did not appear 
to be unanimous support on changes relating to diversity, Lord Sumption, who had 
previously sat as a member of the Judicial Appointment Commission, questioned the 
concept of ‘equal merit’, arguing that at the “upper end of the ability range, there is 
usually clear water between every candidate once one looks at them in detail.” He went 
on to contend that: 
If you dilute the principle of selecting only the most talented candidates by 
introducing criteria other than merit, you will by definition end up with a bench on 
which there are fewer outstanding people. But there is a more serious problem even 
than that. It is the impact that the changes would have on applications […] 
Outstanding candidates will not apply in significant numbers for judicial 
appointments if they believe that the appointments process is designed to favour 
ethnic or gender groups to which they do not belong.
296
 
Lord Sumption is not the only person to have expressed such doubts. In 2003, at the 
time of the original reforms, Sir Thomas Legg, the former permanent secretary at the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department, set out his views on the real tensions that could occur 
when attempting to “diversify the judiciary on the one hand and appointing on merit on 
the other – at least merit as we have hitherto understood it”. He contended that: 
This tension cannot be finessed away by redefining merit as somehow including 
reflectiveness of the community. Selection on merit can have one of at least two 
quite separate meanings. One of those meanings is what one might call maximal 
merit. On this approach, there is only one candidate who is fit for appointment, 
namely the single candidate who is judged to be the best available. This approach 
leaves no room at the point of decision for supplementary policies about the social 
makeup of the judiciary […] The other approach, which I have called minimal merit 
is where all candidates who are judged to reach the agreed minimum standard are 
treated as equally qualified for appointment. The appointing authority is then entitled 
to select among the qualified candidates in accordance with any relevant 
supplementary policy […] Both of these approaches can genuinely claim to be 
appointment on merit, but they can lead to very different results.
297
 
It is unclear whether the Government’s most recent reforms will move selections more 
towards what Legg has described as a minimal merit approach (perhaps, to use a less 
                                                 
296
 Lord Sumption, Home Truths about Judicial Diversity, Bar Council Law Reform Lecture, 15 
November 2012. See also, The Times, “If not now for a woman Lord Chief Justice, when?”, 18 July 
2013 
297
 Legg, T. Brave New World – The New Supreme Court and judicial appointments, in Morgan, D. 
(ed) Constitutional Innovation: The creation of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom; domestic, 
comparative and international reflections, (London, Lexis Nexis, 2004), pp50-51 
 76 
emotive term, a ‘threshold test’).298 The most recent selection of Sir John Thomas as 
Lord Chief Justice (ahead of the heavily tipped Lady Justice Hallett) suggests, that, as 
Joshua Rozenberg put it, the selection panel was determined to “put traditional judging 
skills ahead of a career in the criminal law” and were “not prepared to be swayed by the 
feeling that it would be good for diversity to have a woman at the top.”299 Rozenberg 
will no doubt have disappointed critics of the current system when he concluded on the 
issue of appointments more generally: “with most of the applicants being male, the 
chances that a woman will be the strongest candidate, judged by traditional criteria, are 
statistically small. Nobody wants to change those criteria.”300 
Yet for those who have concerns about a ‘tipping point’ approach, and the impact that it 
could have in the future, they might find that the latest innovation supports the idea of 
Parliamentary confirmation of candidates (to ensure that ‘merit’ is not diluted by other 
considerations).
301
 
A Considered Response? 
While it is true to say that the response of the Government and the Lords Constitution 
Committee did not suggest a great deal of openness to the idea of increased political 
accountability or appointment hearings, the depth of the analysis might well be 
challenged, particularly given the fact that little comparative law work was carried out, 
looking at equivalent systems in other common law countries.
302
 
Moreover, one could see a developing concern amongst individual Members of 
Parliament from across the political spectrum who had thought about the subject more 
deeply. Some of these are self-declared ‘radicals’, such as Douglas Carswell MP, who 
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has said that “there should be a degree of democratic control over judicial 
appointments” along with “a process of transparent Parliamentary hearings to confirm 
senior appointments to the judiciary.”303 During consideration of the Draft Judicial 
Appointment Commission Regulations 2013 and the Draft Supreme Court (Judicial 
Appointments) Regulations 2013, he deprecated the Government’s changes claiming 
that they had failed to bring real reform to judicial appointments. He said: 
At a time when judges are incredibly active in deciding not only what the law says, 
but what they think it should say, we should be introducing regulations to 
democratise the process of judicial appointments. Unfortunately, the draft regulations 
do little to improve democratic accountability […]. 
He contended that the recent changes represented a “squandered opportunity” making 
plain that he felt that the measures “will do nothing to make accountable these powerful 
officials with enormous scope to decide how the country is run.”304 
David Lammy MP, a former junior minister at the Department for Constitutional Affairs 
has argued that: 
The US system is more honest. Senior judges go through confirmation hearings in 
which elected politicians ask them to set out some of their broad assumptions and 
prejudices. This is an explicit recognition that we all have inclinations and biases that 
influence the judgments we make. Making these public helps sift out those with 
extreme attitudes and implicitly encourages judges to guard against pushing their 
own views to hard. We should adopt the same practice for senior judges in Britain, 
with prospective high court judges going through confirmation hearings in 
parliament, which would themselves be televised.
305
 
Most notably, Jack Straw (a former Lord Chancellor who was familiar with the current 
appointments system) gave a Hamlyn Lecture in December 2012, focusing on the issue 
of judicial appointments. He recognised the need for political accountability in two 
cases (although he focused on the role of the Lord Chancellor, rather than that of 
Parliament). The first case was when dealing with an appointment to a post with senior 
managerial responsibilities. He observed that: 
The Lord Chief Justice is by law the head of the judiciary. This post, and those 
of his immediate colleagues, the heads of division, require not only high skills as 
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jurists but also considerable leadership and administrative expertise and the 
ability to relate effectively with the Ministry of Justice, the courts service and 
other organs of government. Since the Lord Chancellor has responsibility to 
parliament for these services, and crucially for the vote of their money, the Lord 
Chancellor has an entirely legitimate interest in the qualities of those who fill 
these posts.
306
 
The second case was when dealing with the most senior members of the judiciary – the 
members of the Supreme Court. He argued that: 
The Supreme Court’s role is wide, and its judgements inevitably have an impact on 
our politics and our lives. However much the individual members are themselves 
detached from party politics, who they are – their perspective, their life experience, 
their approach – matters and is evident from their judgments too.307 
If one accepts both of these views, and believes that Parliament should also have a role 
to play in this process, then one next needs to pose the question: whether Parliament has 
the institutional capacity to conduct appointment hearings, or whether some other model 
should be preferred.
308
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Chapter 6: Do Parliamentary Select Committees have the Capacity to Conduct 
Judicial Confirmation Hearings? 
We need somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognise what it’s like to be a 
young teenage mom, the empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor, or African-
American, or gay or disabled or old – and that’s the criterion by which I’ll be selecting 
any judges. (Barak Obama)
309
 
I wouldn’t approach the issue of judging in the way the President does. He has to 
explain what he meant by judging. I can only explain what I think judges should do, 
which is judges can’t rely on what’s in their heart. They don’t determine the law. 
Congress makes the law. The job of a judge is to apply the law. (Sonia Sotomayor)
310
 
One of the hurdles that stand in the way of introducing confirmation hearings for 
judicial appointments is the question of whether Parliament’s select committees actually 
have the institutional capacity to conduct useful and informative interviews with 
candidates. Some may be sceptical as to whether Parliament has overcome the 
reputation that it had gained at the beginning of the 21
st
 Century as having lost influence 
and become subordinate to the executive. After all, in 2000, in a paper entitled 
Mr Blair’s Poodle, Andrew Tyrie MP stated: 
Parliament has safeguarded freedom and limited government for hundreds of 
years – many of our liberties stem from parliamentary tussles with successive 
governments. Parliament is probably less well–equipped to engage in these 
battles now than ever before in peace time.
311
 
This Chapter will consider these questions in the light of a number of studies examining 
the effectiveness of recently introduced parliamentary hearings (for more general public 
appointments). The Chapter will also reference interviews carried out by the author with 
the Chairman of the Justice and Liaison Committees, Sir Alan Beith, a former Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Falconer QC and a former Permanent Secretary at the (then) Lord 
Chancellor’s Department, Sir Thomas Legg QC. 
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There has been limited academic study of the broad effectiveness of UK select 
committees.
312
 In his book, Who Runs this Place: The Anatomy of Britain in the 21
st
 
Century, the late Anthony Sampson contended that the Westminster Committee system 
had “serious limitations” and that the committees themselves lacked the “teams of 
lawyers and researchers” seen in Washington. Moreover, he criticised the quality of 
questioning by Members of Parliament and the lack of any “special counsel” to assist 
with this task. Whilst an earlier article by the author, focusing on the work of the (then) 
Constitutional Affairs Select Committee attempted to rebut part of this critique
313
 it is 
important to recognise that despite being frequently described by the press as 
“powerful” or “influential”, UK select committees have variable reputations and are 
certainly not as well-resourced as their US counterparts. 
There have been significant reforms of the select committee system in recent years 
(discussed further below) and it is argued that the “election of select committee chairs 
by the House and of members by party colleagues is also likely to have increased select 
committees’ credibility and legitimacy.”314 
The practice of parliamentary committees conducting public hearings in respect of 
public appointments did not start with the reforms of 2008. Rather, it commenced with 
the Treasury Committee in 1997
315
, which announced the intention to hold hearings 
with individuals nominated to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of 
England.
316
 The Institute for Government recorded, in 2011, that there had been a total 
of 24 MPC hearings, and that the Committee only asked the Government to “think 
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again” on one occasion. The Government exercised its prerogative to proceed with the 
appointment. The Institute noted: “Reflecting on the Chancellor’s decision to disregard 
its objections, the committee concluded that the hearings played an important function 
nonetheless.”317 
Subsequent interest in these types of hearings was fairly extensive.
318
 In 2002, scrutiny 
of major public appointments was included in the ten core tasks for select committees 
drawn up by the Liaison Committee. The Public Administration Committee published a 
report in 2003, Government by Appointment: Opening up the Patronage State, whilst 
the issue was also considered by the Power Commission, in its paper Power to the 
People: The Report of Power, an Independent Inquiry into Britain’s Democracy in 
2006.
319
 
Following Gordon Brown’s appointment as Prime Minister, further reform was 
proposed. The Governance of Britain Green Paper, published in July 2007 
recommended that Government nominees for certain key positions “should be subject to 
a pre-appointment hearing with the relevant select committee”. It was suggested that the 
hearing “would cover issues such as the candidate’s suitability for the role, his or her 
key priorities and the process used in selection”.320 
This proposal was welcomed by both the Public Administration Select Committee, 
which published a report on the subject in January 2008,
321
 and the House of Commons 
Liaison Committee. The latter produced a set of guidelines for the conduct of hearings. 
A final list of posts that would be subject to this new form of scrutiny was agreed 
between the Liaison Committee and the Government in May 2008.
322
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At this stage, the committees did not have a veto power over any appointments, and the 
experiment was subject to assessment and review. The Liaison Committee 
commissioned the Constitution Unit at University College London to conduct a research 
project on the operation and impact of hearings.
323
 The Constitution Unit study 
conducted by Peter Waller and Mark Chalmers and entitled An Evaluation of Pre-
Appointment Scrutiny Hearings was published in February 2010. The authors 
interviewed over 60 individuals who were involved in the process, including Committee 
Chairs, Members and Clerks, preferred candidates and Departmental Officials.  
The final report noted that there had been “a positive benefit from the new approach in 
terms of democracy and transparency” although it concluded that “it has been a modest 
step not a giant stride”. It also stated that the majority of the preferred candidates 
“supported the hearings” and felt that they were “beneficial to them” and justified on 
“democratic grounds”.324 The study did not record any “deterrent effect to good quality 
candidates” arising from the hearings.325 
One significant issue that arose, however, was what should happen if a committee 
produced a negative report on a candidate. Out of the 18 hearings considered by the 
Constitution Unit, this only occurred once (the appointment of the Children’s 
Commissioner for England). Whilst the majority of candidates interviewed by the Unit 
had suggested that they would not take up a role following a negative report, in the case 
of the Children’s Commissioner the then Secretary of State, Ed Balls, chose to confirm 
the appointment of the preferred candidate, who accepted the position. The report 
recorded that there was considerable press coverage of the issue following Ed Balls’ 
decision and there was some speculation that the dispute arose as “part of a wider 
political conflict between the Committee and the Secretary of State”.326 
Whatever the reason for the decision, the case was the first example of a 
recommendation not to appoint and led some observers to suggest that the process was 
“a sham”.327 Since then, issues have been raised about candidates for positions as the 
Chief Inspector of Probation; the Chair of the Statistics Authority (in 2011); and, the 
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Director of the Office for Fair Access (in 2012). These recommendations met with 
mixed responses as some candidates reluctantly withdrew, while others, such as 
Professor Les Ebdon, were appointed in any event.
328
 This would be a significant issue 
if this type of hearing was introduced for Supreme Court judges. As noted elsewhere, if 
a veto power were not included, supporters of the idea of hearings would have to clarify 
what would happen if the committee did not express confidence in a candidate at a pre-
appointment hearing and whether the candidate could still be appointed (and retain the 
confidence of the Court).
329
 
Following the May 2010 election and the formation of the Coalition Government, there 
was an agreement to “strengthen the powers of Select Committees to scrutinise major 
public appointments”.330 In a response to the Liaison Committee’s pre-election report, 
the Government said that it would offer pre-appointment hearings for major public 
appointments “on a permanent basis”.331 It also agreed to “examine further the need for 
consolidated guidance where committees are minded to recommend against Ministers’ 
preferred candidates.”332 This reform was combined with Parliament’s adoption of the 
proposal of the Wright Committee to introduce election (by the whole House of 
Commons) for Chairs of departmental select committees
333
 giving rise to at least a 
perception of an increasingly powerful select committee system. 
Another important development was a concession, by the Government, of a veto power 
over appointments to the new Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). This control was 
granted in the form of a statutory power, contained in Schedule 1 to the Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011. 
The precedent was extended in February 2011, when Lord McNally gave a written 
ministerial statement announcing that the Government would strengthen Parliament’s 
role in the appointment of the next Information Commissioner by allowing the Justice 
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Select Committee a pre-appointment hearing with veto powers.
334
 He stated that, upon 
the appointment of the next commissioner in 2014, the Government would offer the 
Justice Select Committee “a pre-appointment hearing with the preferred candidate and 
will accept the committee’s conclusion on whether or not the candidate should be 
appointed.” He said that this would “make the appointment process more open and 
transparent and enhance the independence of the office.”335 
Further analysis of the success of these new public appointment hearings was offered in 
a paper published in March 2011 by the Institute of Government. In a report drafted by 
Akash Paun and David Atkinson, entitled Balancing Act: the right role for parliament 
in public appointments, the Institute recommended that Parliament should be given an 
effective veto on appointments from what it described as an “A list” of 25 top public 
appointments as it had over the head of the OBR. In a foreword to the report, Lord 
Andrew Adonis, a former minister in the Labour administration and the Director of the 
Institute, argued that: 
In a parliamentary democracy, effective parliamentary scrutiny and accountability 
are vital to the legitimacy of government. These proposals, which build on existing 
good practice, will serve to enhance that legitimacy.
336
 
The paper acknowledged Parliament’s increasing role in the public appointments 
process and argued that involving Parliament in the appointments process brought a 
number of advantages, including increasing the transparency of the appointment process 
and the democratic accountability of executive functions carried out at ‘arm’s length’ 
from ministers.
337
  
The Institute for Government concurred with the Constitution Unit’s analysis that the 
“public nature of pre-appointment hearings and other forms of parliamentary scrutiny 
enhances the transparency of the appointments process.” It also argued that the 
“transparent nature of committee scrutiny can be a way to put pressure on government 
to follow better practice during the appointment process itself” and that MPs can test is 
the ability of the preferred candidate “to stand up to robust public scrutiny.” It 
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concluded that “the expansion of parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments has 
delivered (albeit small) benefits in terms of improved governance and 
accountability.”338 
Amongst all of this there seemed a growing recognition that the “cult of the non 
political”, as Sir Ross Cranston has dubbed it, has had only limited success, since it is 
not possible to take the politics out of important decisions by entrusting them to 
quangos or appointment commissions.
339
 
Are there any Lessons to be Drawn? 
When considering whether any lessons can be drawn from the apparently successful 
rollout of pre-appointment hearings for public appointments, one first has to consider 
some of the obstacles that have been noted in the past. 
As indicated elsewhere,
340
 proponents of a move towards parliamentary confirmation 
hearings have some significant obstacles to overcome. These include some practical 
issues around the current select committee system, such as the effect of the devolution 
settlement (and whether Scotland, Northern Ireland and even Wales
341
 would be content 
to have ‘their’ Supreme Court appointments confirmed by the Westminster Parliament).  
Another issue, which was raised by the Institute of Government study, was the 
capability of parliamentary select committees to “exercise meaningful assessment of 
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professional competence in highly specialist areas”.342 This is one area where the 
currently unreformed House of Lords could prove of assistance, as there is considerable 
legal expertise in the House of Lords Constitution Committee. This was an option 
favoured by Sir Thomas Legg, in an interview with an author; he suggested that 
hearings ought to be conducted with representatives of the whole of Parliament. The 
American analogy, as far as is relevant, points to at least some involvement of the upper 
House.
343
 
However, not only is the future composition of the House of Lords unclear, but the use 
of unelected Peers would detract from the democratic nature of the process. If one looks 
to the House of Commons, it is also worth noting that as the Ministry of Justice little 
resembles its historic predecessor, the Lord Chancellor’s Department; the Justice 
Committee has moved a long way from its first incarnation and the judicial 
appointments system is now only one of a large number of significant priorities. Finally, 
there is the issue of trust in politicians and the political process. As has been observed 
elsewhere, the “opinion formed by Parliament is not necessarily based on evidence and 
reason, it is the upshot of the reflections of a collection of political individuals, it is 
likely to be – and entitled to be – influenced by considerations of political 
expediency.”344 
Historically, select committees have been unenthusiastic about idea of judicial 
confirmation hearings. The (then) Constitutional Affairs Select Committee resisted any 
moves towards a confirmation process when it considered the issue in 2004, noting that 
it had “heard no convincing evidence to indicate that confirmation hearings would 
improve the process of appointing senior judges”.345 It appeared to accept the 
Government’s arguments that “MPs and lay peer would not necessarily be competent to 
assess the appointees’ legal and judicial skills” and that if the intention was to assess 
“their more general approach to issues of public importance” then this would be 
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“inconsistent with the move to take the Supreme Court out of the potential political 
arena”.346 
During the course of the Governance of Britain reforms, the Government did briefly 
revisit the idea of restructuring the judicial appointment system. However, it quickly 
backed away from this idea, after reporting that a substantial majority of respondents to 
its consultation had “opposed any role for the legislature in the selection or making of 
judicial appointments, and in particular to confirmation hearings”.347 The Lords 
Constitution Committee seemed to welcome this development, suggesting that it is no 
more enamoured with the idea than its former Commons counterpart. 
Finally, in interviews with the author, it was suggested by both Lord Falconer and Sir 
Alan Beith that there was a difference between appointing quango chiefs and senior 
judges. Sir Alan argued that “we appoint judges not for their opinions, but for their 
ability to set aside their opinions and make fair judgements.”  He said that with quango 
candidates, it was “perfectly legitimate” for committees to try to establish the 
candidate’s interest and sympathy with the policy direction which the Government had 
for the continuance (or even setting up) of non-departmental public bodies, but that 
“policy questions were not reasonable or appropriate questions to ask a judge”.348 This 
was the view taken by the House of Lords Constitution Committee, which concluded 
that: 
The benefits of pre-appointment hearings in respect of senior public appointments 
are many, but the relationship between Parliament and the judiciary is a unique one. 
Parliament is best placed to protect the independence of, for example, ombudsmen 
from the executive. Judges must be independent of both the executive and 
Parliament: it is imperative that they remain one step removed from the political 
process.
349
 
While he accepted that there might be differences where judges were taking up an 
administrative role, such as Head of the Family Division, Sir Alan argued that the select 
committee was better off talking to the appropriate judge according to the inquiry the 
committee was carrying out at any given time. He also took the view that parliamentary 
committees had a number of disadvantages when seeking to interview someone as 
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though they were the candidate for a job, since they did not meet the other candidates, 
and were not able to carry out the sort of exercises or tests that are done to see whether 
people are suitable for particular posts. 
Lord Falconer agreed with Sir Alan’s view on the nature of the roles, contending that 
Parliament was not holding the judges to account; rather it was there to ensure that the 
appointments system was fair and reasonable. He said that “trying to draw a parallel 
between the Children’s Commissioner and similar jobs on the one hand and the judges 
on another is a dangerous route.”350 
He also went further by questioning whether committees would have sufficient 
standing, so that people would respect their views of a particular prospective candidate. 
Many of the principled objections to the introduction of confirmation hearings seemed 
to stem from a fear of heading towards the US model of Senate confirmation 
hearings.
351
 Malleson notes the traditional view that since “the highly politicized US 
Senate confirmation hearings of candidates Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas the use 
of confirmation hearings has become almost as distasteful in the UK as judicial 
elections.”352 In evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Roger Smith 
(then director of the NGO JUSTICE) described the proposal as “a quagmire into which 
no one would want to go.”353 Conversely, it is sometimes suggested that in the US, 
candidates are used to the process and can row back from controversial views that they 
might once have expressed, leading to hearings that are “so anodyne as to be 
‘redundant’”.354 An example of this can be seen in the quote from Sonia Sotomayor at 
the start of this Chapter.  
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Few have seemed willing to look at other jurisdictions, such as the recently established 
Canadian model, notwithstanding the fact that it has been suggested that “the general 
consensus is that these hearings have been very successful.”355 The first of these 
hearings took place in February 2006, when Marshall Rothstein, a judge of the Federal 
Court of Appeal, appeared before a committee of parliamentarians chaired by an 
academic lawyer, Peter Hogg. The hearing lasted for over three hours and it is suggested 
that on most accounts, the questioning was “respectful.” At the end of the meeting, the 
Minister of Justice asked the members of the committee to communicate their views on 
Justice Rothstein to the Prime Minister. In the words of Peter Hogg, “the nominee’s 
credentials, his statement to the committee, and his answers to the questions left no 
doubt as to his suitability for appointment, and the reaction of the committee members 
left no doubt that they would advise the Prime Minister to proceed with 
appointment.”356 These hearings have now been used for the appointment of several 
more Canadian Supreme Court Justices including Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis in 
2011 and Justice Wagner in 2012. 
What Difference Would it Make? 
It would be wrong to think that the introduction of pre-appointment hearings would be a 
panacea and end the tensions between the various branches of Government – such a 
suggestion would be ridiculous and it is arguable that the current tensions that exist are 
inevitable in any system in which the powers of one branch are checked by another. 
Furthermore, while the introduction of pre-appointment hearings might eventually have 
an impact on the domestic courts, it would have no impact on the development of the 
law by foreign courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
In those circumstances, and given the challenges listed above, what difference would 
the addition of pre-appointment hearings have, and what would be the benefit of 
introducing them? 
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Although the House of Lords Constitution Committee recently concluded against the 
idea of confirmation hearings
357
, it did receive evidence from supporters, who pointed 
out a number of potential benefits. These included the fact that Parliament has the 
power to scrutinise all acts of the executive— appointments of senior judges are an 
important exercise of ministerial discretion and should be subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny which is a useful check against political bias; that Parliamentary hearings could 
act as a check on political patronage, help to ensure that independent and robust 
candidates are appointed and add to the appointee’s legitimacy; and that Parliament 
nowadays has little contact with the judges: the senior judges are largely unknown to 
MPs; Supreme Court Justices will be unknown to the Lords now that the law lords have 
departed—through dialogue, political and judicial actors can better understand the 
constraints under which the other operates.
358
 Sir Thomas Legg considered it to be 
“more and more desirable that our most senior judges should be able to ground their 
mandate on the authority, not only of the executive, still less of the judges themselves 
and a few laymen alone, but of Parliament itself.”359 
Andrew Le Sueur, a former special adviser and legal adviser to a number of 
parliamentary committees, including the Lords Constitution Committee and the House 
of Commons Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, has recently contended that: 
Select committees have acquired a central role in accountability practices relating to 
the judicial system. They provide the most rigorous sort of parliamentary scrutiny, 
conducting thematic inquiries based on oral and written evidence. On occasion, the 
launch of an inquiry makes front-page news.
360
 
The effectiveness of committees should not be underestimated.
361
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
It is said that former parliamentarian and minister, Tony Benn, used to ask anyone in a 
position of power: “What power have you got; where did it come from; in whose 
interests do you exercise it; and, to whom are you accountable?”362 These are questions 
that members of the senior judiciary are now being expected to answer. 
There is a growing recognition that senior judicial appointments, particularly at the 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court level, are not made in a particularly transparent or 
accountable way.
363
 It is hard to say that press coverage of the process of appointments 
has been any more positive than when the discredited “secret soundings” process was 
used by previous Lord Chancellors. The, frankly opaque, process that is currently 
employed to select the most senior judges does not appear sustainable as the choice of 
senior judges is “too important to be left to a quango” or a committee dominated by the 
judges.
364
 
While the reputation of the judiciary in the United Kingdom is still secure, that is not to 
say that one should overlook the reputational dangers to what has been described as a 
potentially “self-perpetuating oligarchy”.365 Increased transparency alone is not enough. 
While it may be beneficial that those who are not directly involved in the appointments 
process should know more about the candidates, for there to be increased confidence in 
the system it is arguable that there needs to be an opportunity for that knowledge to be 
used by those who are democratically accountable. 
Whether or not one accepts that the judiciary is more ‘activist’ than in the past, it is 
apparent that there is an accountability deficit, having regard to its new constitutional 
position and its role in making policy. Professor Peter Russell has argued that the UK’s 
judicial appointment processes are “the least accountable” in the common law world 
because they rely on judicial appointment commissions that have “no elected politicians 
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in [their] membership and no devices to enhance transparency.”366 Mary Clark, has gone 
as far as suggesting that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 “substantially substituted 
the judiciary for the executive in judicial appointments, bolstering the power of the 
judiciary to check the executive.”367 In spite of the most recent constitutional reforms, 
changes to these arrangements have not been significant (and in relation to more junior 
judicial appointments, the influence of the judges has increased). Therefore, one might 
argue that some form of additional public accountability may be more important than 
the justices’ fear of politicisation.368  
It is clearly both impossible and undesirable to seek to introduce a form of hard 
accountability (in the sense of requiring judges to account to politicians for their 
decisions). As this thesis demonstrates, it is essential to keep in mind how any changes 
might impact on concepts such as judicial independence, since these are likely to form 
the nucleus around which objections to any reform will form. It will also be necessary to 
consider how any relaxation of the structural separation of powers, so recently 
confirmed by the last Labour Government, can be justified and whether introducing 
political accountability has any impact on the balance of powers that we recognise in the 
UK.  
If one accepts the need for additional accountability, then it is important to consider the 
interaction between the concepts of independence and accountability alongside the 
necessary level of accountability. The new structures and hierarchies introduced by the 
judiciary are an interesting development that may lead to further consideration about the 
doctrine of judicial independence and the also ways in which the judiciary should be 
held accountable. First, in spite of the new reluctance to appear before select 
committees, discussed above, it is likely that at some point Parliament will wish to 
consider the managerial capacity (and competence) of the judiciary. This is a very 
distinct issue from the conduct of individual cases and it is at least arguable that the 
judiciary should be properly held to account as to management and expenditure. This is 
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likely to prove increasingly relevant following the most recent reforms to the 
management of the Supreme Court. 
In the past, it has often appeared that judges have been given a relatively easy ride (as 
they are usually questioned about the sufficiency of the resources provided by the 
Ministry of Justice, rather than whether the judiciary as an institution could make 
changes for the sake of efficiency). The House of Lords Constitution Committee has 
already confirmed that it believes that “it is clearly acceptable for committees to 
question judges on the administration of the justice system and the way in which the 
judiciary is managed.”369 In those circumstances, parliamentarians may come to regret 
conceding the point that the Lord Chief Justice can (at least theoretically) select judicial 
attendees before Committees (since they may wish to speak to those who are at the 
coalface).  
Second, the new arrangements may well fundamentally alter the structure of the 
judiciary as an institution. When the constitutional reforms that resulted in the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 were being discussed, there was still fundamental 
opposition to the idea of a ‘career judiciary’ on the continental model (although greater 
a need for greater flexibility was acknowledged).
370
 Slowly, with the structural changes 
instituted by the judges, combined with the new criteria for appointment brought in by 
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act (designed to help recruit more diverse 
candidates) one can see such a transformation happening (albeit very incrementally).
371
 
The tone of the consultation, A Judiciary for the 21st Century, suggested that this trend 
was likely to accelerate. 
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Finally, historically, those commentating on the concept of judicial independence often 
focused on the independence of the individual judge. Again, this has changed slowly; so 
that there is now at least as much focus on institutional independence. While 
recognising the judiciary as a proper branch of government may be beneficial, it opens 
up new dangers, particularly in respect of the independence of individual judges. They 
may now be subject to management and discipline from other judges (including Heads 
of Divisions and the Lord Chief Justice) and offered ‘guidance’ from bodies such as the 
Judicial Executive Board (which has been described as being like a “sort of judicial 
Cabinet”372), the JSB and the Judges’ Council. Under the current appointments process, 
their prospects for promotion may also be impacted by the views of the most senior 
judges. This issue will become even more relevant if the Government comes to accept 
the idea of a career judiciary. Few, if any, other institutions are moving towards self-
regulation in this way. 
What, if any, conclusions can be drawn from all of this? One could start out by saying if 
one rejects the concept of a ‘pure’ separation of powers, in favour of Barendt’s 
emphasis on the nature of checks and balances within the constitution; it becomes 
possible to see advantages in giving Parliament a role in the judicial appointments 
process. Some overlap of functions and office holders may be welcome.
373
 As Lord 
Neuberger has observed “our system of government is and has always been based on 
pragmatism, not on principle, on organic practical development not detailed theoretical 
codes.”374 
On that basis, it is worth reflecting on the fact that, while the judiciary has always 
seemed extremely nervous about allowing Parliament any input in appointments and 
any real oversight over the system, during many of the Government’s hasty 
constitutional reforms, it has been Parliament that has protected the position of the 
judiciary. In particular, it was parliamentary committees that acted during the 
Government’s botched reforms of 2005375; and over the creation of the Ministry of 
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Justice in 2007.
376
 More recently, it was the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
which intervened during the passage of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and helped the 
judges secure what they saw as ‘improvements’ to the legislation (while resisting 
changes which they did not support). In such circumstances, it is difficult to see why the 
judiciary would feel that Parliament was an inappropriate forum; whereas the executive 
has maintained its accountably function. 
As to judicial independence, the initial question remains unchanged since Robert 
Stevens’ spelled it out (and Sir Stephen Sedley echoed his words) in the early 1990s: 
“How far beyond the independence of individual judges does England want to go? [...] 
How far is it prepared to provide support for a concept of the separation of powers, and 
within that a concept of judicial independence which would allow the English judges to 
be thought of as a co-ordinate branch of Government?”377 
If, as appears to be the case, the judiciary wishes to be accepted as a proper branch of 
government, then perhaps the need for checks on its own power becomes more 
apparent. Certainly this author would argue that there are two separate reasons for 
looking at methods of increasing accountability. The first relates to the transfer of 
powers and responsibility to the judiciary. Views about the separation of powers, 
parliamentary sovereignty and the constitutionally acceptable role of judges are highly 
contested within the senior judiciary
378
, therefore these appointments are 
constitutionally significant. The second is the need to ensure that there is some oversight 
of the new judicial empire, its management and efficiency. Parliament, as the “apex of 
accountability in the political process”, seems the proper forum for any such 
oversight.
379
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The question then arises that even if one agrees that there is a role for parliament in the 
appointments process, what that role should be. Erika Rackley has suggested two broad 
options – either Parliament has a supervisory role, overseeing the running and remit of 
the appointments process, or it has a role in deciding which candidate to appoint.
380
 
While both options may have advantages, this author would contend that the latter 
would be preferable. 
While this may seem ambitious, when considering the nature of the accountability 
mechanism that might be acceptable, it is worth revisiting division between the judicial 
accountability and accountability for the appointments process.  
Additional systems of accountability for appointments are likely to have only a limited 
impact on the (perhaps more old fashioned) notion of judicial independence as it relates 
to the individual judge – once appointed, a judge is not subject to any form of improper 
influence. Moreover, as long as there is a continued role for an independent judicial 
appointments commission to recruit and screen candidates at first instance, the extent of 
any politicisation could effectively be restrained.  
A last thought is that while it seems settled that it is for the courts to act as the fetter on 
the legislature and executive when creating law and exercising administrative power 
under the law, if additional methods of political accountability are not introduced, what 
fetter could (and should) be placed on judicial lawmaking and how else can one enhance 
the legitimacy of an increasingly powerful senior judiciary; or in the more common 
parlance, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
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